A Guide to Surety Bail Bond Forfeitures
This guide seeks to provide clarity on a complex and essential aspect of Florida’s criminal justice system, by explaining the legal framework of surety bail bond forfeiture proceedings in Florida, applicable timelines, and potential remedies available to defendants and sureties when forfeiture occurs.[1]
As mandated by the constitutions of the United States, Amendment IV, and of the State of Florida, art. I, §14, the trial court determines the conditions of pre-trial release as a preliminary step in a criminal court prosecution. The posting of a bail bond is one form of gaining pre-trial release. The defendant, his or her counsel, and the state attorney assist the criminal court judge in determining whether a bail bond is proper and in setting the amount of a bail bond.
A surety bail bond is a three-way contract among the state, the defendant, and a surety, under which the surety guarantees to the state that the defendant will appear at subsequent court proceedings.[2] Release of the accused on a surety bail bond commits him or her to the exclusive custody of the surety.[3] F.S. §903.045 states that: “It is the public policy of this state and the intent of the legislature that a criminal surety bond shall be construed as a commitment by and an obligation upon the bail bond agent to ensure the defendant appears at all criminal proceedings for which the surety bond is posted.”
The failure of a defendant to appear at any hearing as required launches the bail bond forfeiture process in which the clerk of court, the clerk’s legal counsel, and the surety’s attorney are essentially responsible for conducting the forfeiture proceedings. The defendant’s counsel and the state attorney are no longer primarily involved.
Forfeiture
The defendant’s failure to appear as required results in forfeiture of the bond.[4] The imposition and the consequences of the forfeiture, and the possible mitigation or avoidance of those consequences, are the essential framework of bond forfeiture proceedings. Forfeiture is addressed in three distinct sections of Ch. 903: §903.26 (Forfeiture of the Bond); §903.27 (Forfeiture to Judgment); and §903.28 (Remission of Forfeiture). The three statutory provisions should be considered and applied singularly and not in combination, based upon the nature of the motion filed with the court.
Section 903.26 Deals with Forfeiture of the Bond, Discharge of Forfeiture, and Payment
• Entry of Forfeiture — Upon the defendant’s failure to appear before the court, the clerk automatically enters the forfeiture by issuing a notice of forfeiture.[5] In the event the defendant appears in court on the same day as required, the court may waive the forfeiture in its discretion and in the interest of justice.[6] This window of discretion is small, as the clerk must not be precluded by the court from entering forfeiture based upon the defendant appearing later than the required day.[7] The forfeiture, the face amount of the bond, must be paid to the clerk within 60 days of the date the notice of forfeiture was transmitted by the clerk.[8]
• Setting Aside Forfeiture — Section 903.26 imposes upon the state a condition precedent to a forfeiture of the bond: the information, indictment, or affidavit must be filed within six months from the date of arrest.[9] The statute also imposes upon the clerk of court a condition precedent to forfeiture of the bond: The clerk must give the surety 72-hour notice, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, before the time of the required appearance of the defendant, unless the time for appearance is within 72 hours from the time of arrest, or if the time is stated on the bond.[10] Failure of the state to file charges within six months of arrest, or failure of the clerk of court to furnish the 72-hour notice required by F.S. §903.26(1)(b) undermines the basis of the forfeiture, and the caselaw requires that the forfeiture be set aside by the court upon the surety’s request.[11]
• Discharge of Forfeiture by the Court — Discharge of a forfeiture is a purely statutory remedy. Section 903.26(5) sets out four circumstances that authorize a discharge of the forfeiture by the court. The contractual doctrines of impossibility of performance and prevention of performance underlie the statutory bases for discharge of a forfeiture by the court. F.S. §903.26(5)(a)-(d) provides that a forfeiture must be discharged within 60 days upon:
a) A determination that it was impossible for the defendant to appear as required or within 60 days after the date of the required appearance due to circumstances beyond the defendant’s control. The potential adverse economic consequences of appearing as required may not be considered as ground for such a determination;
b) A determination that, at the time of the required appearance or within 60 days after the date of the required appearance, the defendant was confined in an institution or hospital; was confined in any county, state, federal, or immigration detention facility; was deported; or is deceased;
c) Surrender or arrest of the defendant at the time of the required appearance or within 60 days after that date in any county, state, or federal jail or prison and upon a hold being placed to return the defendant to the jurisdiction of the court. The court shall condition a discharge, on the payment of costs and expenses incurred by an official in returning the defendant to the jurisdiction of the court;
d) A determination that the state is unwilling to seek extradition of the defendant within 30 days after the request by the surety agent to do so, and contingent upon the surety agent’s consent to pay all costs and expenses incurred by an official in returning the defendant, up to the penal amount of the bond.
The express basis for discharge under F.S. §903.26(5)(a) or due to the pre-forfeiture death of the defendant in F.S. §903.26(5)(b) is impossibility of performance. The basis for the discharges authorized by F.S. §903.26(5)(b),(c), and (d) is prevention by the government of the surety agent’s right to control the defendant.[12]
A discharge must not be ordered for any reason other than specified in these four subsections of §903.26(5). The court may not consider equitable arguments or other statutes.[13] The surety must pay the forfeiture or must apply for and obtain discharge within 60 days of the clerk’s transmission of the notice of forfeiture to the surety.[14] These 60-day limits are jurisdictional and may not be extended or excused.[15]
• Discharge of Forfeiture by Clerk — A substantial majority of forfeitures are discharged according to F.S. §903.26(8) without involvement or entry of an order by the court. This statutory section provides that in the event the defendant is arrested and returned to the county of jurisdiction of the court or has posted a new bond for the case at issue before judgment is entered, the clerk upon affirmation by the sheriff or the chief correctional officer must, without further hearing or order of the court, discharge the forfeiture of the bond.[16] Discharge by the clerk is conditioned upon the surety agent paying the costs and expenses of returning the defendant to the county of jurisdiction.[17]
Section 903.27 Covers the Process from Forfeiture to Judgment
F.S. §903.27(1) grants the clerk of the circuit court the power to enter a final, executable judgment against the surety in bond forfeiture proceedings.[18] In the event the forfeiture is not paid by delivery of funds to the clerk, or discharged by order of the court, within 60 days of transmission of the notice of forfeiture, the clerk must enter a judgment against the surety for the amount of the forfeiture, the face amount of the bond, and issue execution.[19] In the event the forfeiture had previously been discharged, yet the surety failed to pay the costs and expenses of returning the defendant to the jurisdiction, then the amount of the judgment may not exceed the unpaid transportation fees and costs.[20] The consequences of entry of judgment may become crippling to the surety and its agent, as surety bail bonds may not be executed by a bail bond agent against whom a judgment has been entered and remains unpaid for 35 days, and may not be executed by a bail bond surety company against whom judgement has been entered and remains unpaid for 50 days.[21]
• Setting Aside Judgment — F.S. §903.27(5) provides that the surety may within 35 days of notice of the judgment, file a motion to set aside or stay the judgment, conditioned upon the surety depositing the amount of the judgment with the clerk, which must be held in escrow. The filing of such a motion and making of the deposit acts as an automatic stay of further forfeiture proceedings, including execution, against the surety or its agent.[22] The statute does not state a basis for the court to set aside a judgment.[23]
Although contrary to legal authority, it is common for a surety’s counsel to request that a forfeiture judgment be set aside under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540. Prior to the 1972 revision of Fla. Const. art. V (The Judiciary), the trial court dealing with a bail bond forfeiture was often a lower-level court solely with criminal jurisdiction, and lacking jurisdiction to enter a money judgment, for example, a justice of the peace, a municipal court, or a county court. That court of limited jurisdiction would enter an order of forfeiture, and that order along with an affidavit of forfeiture, and request for entry of judgment of forfeiture, were transferred to the circuit court civil division for entry of a money judgment.[24] Older cases stating in dicta the possibility of a claim for relief from judgment under Rule 1.540 are vestiges of that abolished court jurisdiction and procedure for entry of judgment.
Presently, the entire surety bail bond proceeding, including entry of judgment by the clerk of court, is conducted in a criminal court proceeding under Ch. 903, “Criminal Procedure Law.” Being a rule of civil procedure, Rule 1.540 is inapplicable in that criminal court proceeding.[25]
The court of appeal in State v. American Bankers Ins., 558 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), determines that the 1986 amendments to §903.27, fully prescribe the rights and obligations of the parties seeking relief from judgment.[26] On that basis the appellate court determines that relief from judgment under Rule 1.540 is no longer available to a surety.[27] The court of appeal in American Bankers Ins. further limits the allowable scope of a motion to set aside a forfeiture judgment in ruling that “a motion to set aside the judgment under §903.27(5) only allows the trial court to revisit errors of substance or procedure leading up to the entry of judgment.”[28]
I found the caselaw to reference three examples of such errors, all of which are errors by the clerk of court: 1) failure of the clerk to provide the 72-hour notice of hearing to the surety and defendant;[29] 2) a premature entry of the judgment by the clerk;[30] and 3) entry of judgment despite the forfeiture being timely paid.[31] As these errors render the judgment of forfeiture void, they may be raised beyond the 35-day time limit of §903.27(5).[32]
An independent civil proceeding initiated by a surety to claim a return of a portion of the forfeiture that has been paid is precluded and properly dismissed, as the remedy to set aside a judgment afforded by §903.27 is the sole remedy available.[33]
Section 903.28 Concerns Remission of Forfeiture
F.S. §904.28 allows for a remission, a forgiveness and refund, of all or a portion of a forfeiture timely paid by a surety. The purpose of the remission statute, §903.28, is to create a financial incentive for sureties to locate and apprehend fugitive defendants.[34] The legislature encourages the expeditious apprehension or surrender of a defendant by providing a graduated scale that calculates the percentage of forfeiture remittable to the surety according to the amount of time that passes between the date of the forfeiture and the date when the defendant is returned to justice.[35]
Remission is not an equitable remedy, and the appellate courts quote §903.28(7) in holding, “Remission of a forfeiture is a wholly statutory remedy that may not be ordered for any reason other than specified in the statute.”[36] These reasons or conditions for remission have been summarized by the courts as follows:
Pursuant to [§]903.28, certain conditions precedent must be met before a court is authorized to order remission of a forfeited bond. First, there must have been no breach of the bond. Second, the surety must have apprehended or have substantially attempted to procure or cause the apprehension or surrender of the defendant. And third the delay has not thwarted the proper prosecution of the defendant.[37]
• No Breach of the Bond — F.S. §903.28(1) provides that “[o]n application within two years from forfeiture, the court shall order remission if it determines that there was no breach of the bond.” The breach referenced is of the requirement in §903.26 (2)(a) that the forfeiture must be paid within 60 days of transmission of the notice of forfeiture by the clerk.[38] Failure to pay the forfeiture within that 60-day period precludes remission.[39]
• Returning Defendant to the Jurisdiction — Under the holding in Brevard County v. Barber Bonding Agency, 860 So. 2d 10, 12 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003), “the time of surrender or apprehension of the skipping defendant stops the times running in [§]903.28 without regard to the apprehension or surrender is in a different or even foreign jurisdiction, or for different criminal charges.”[40] Although the clock may be stopped upon the defendant surrendering or being apprehended, a remission may not be properly ordered, unless and until the defendant is “returned to the jurisdiction of the court.”[41] A failure to have the defendant returned to the jurisdiction serves to thwart prosecution, which also precludes the grant of or remission as discussed below.[42]
“Jurisdiction” here means the county from which the defendant was released on bail.[43] F.S. §903.28(2)-(6) requires that the “costs of returning the defendant to the jurisdiction of the court have been deducted from the remission.”[44]
• Proper Prosecution Not Thwarted — In order to grant a remission, the court must determine in its discretion whether or not the delay in returning the defendant to the jurisdiction of the court resulted in a thwarting of proper prosecution.[45] Not every delay caused by a disappearance of a defendant thwarts prosecution, it is prejudice to the state on account of the delay that establishes that proper prosecution has been thwarted.[46] Prejudice to the state is presumed as a result of delay in bringing the absconded defendant to trial, however,[47] and the surety has the burden to overcome/rebut this presumption.[48]
Section 903.28(8) requires the surety’s “application for a remission be accompanied by affidavits setting forth the facts on which it is founded.”[49] The surety must establish by “further documentation or evidence” any attempts at procuring or causing the apprehension or surrender of the defendant if such is claimed by the surety.[50] The clerk of court and the state attorney must be furnished copies of all papers, applications, and affidavits, and given 20 days’ notice before any hearing on the application for remission.[51] The surety’s affidavit must not be merely conclusory; it must cite the specific efforts surety made to show it substantially attempted to procure the return of the defendant.[52]
In the event all conditions precedent have been met, §903.28 provides a graduated scale for a remission “of up to, but not more than”: 100% of the forfeiture if the defendant surrenders or is apprehended within 90 days after forfeiture; 95% of the forfeiture if the defendant surrenders or is apprehended within 180 days after forfeiture; 90% of the forfeiture if the defendant surrenders or is apprehended within 270 days after forfeiture; 85% of the forfeiture if the defendant surrenders or is apprehended within one year after forfeiture; 50% of the forfeiture if the defendant surrenders or is apprehended within two years after forfeiture.[53]
The statute does not require the surety to have participated in the apprehension or surrender of the defendant provided the costs of returning the defendant to the jurisdiction of the court have been deducted from the remission.53
Impossibility or Prevention of Return of Defendant
The contractual doctrines of impossibility of performance and prevention of performance are often raised by a surety to excuse the surety’s failure to gain the return of the defendant to the jurisdiction of the court as is necessary to obtain a remission. Appellate courts in Florida have consistently rejected the assertion that a surety’s failure is excused as an act of God or a third party has made it impossible to return the defendant to the jurisdiction for proper prosecution as required by F.S. §903.28(2)-(6).[54]
A line of cases establishes that the surety is not excused when the nonappearance of the defendant results from the defendant’s own voluntary act in committing a criminal offense in another jurisdiction, whether before or after a bail bond was posted.[55] For example, in Clerk of Collier County v. Hernandez, 345 So. 3d 965 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022), the defendant, while out on bond, committed a criminal act against the U.S. and was arrested by the F.B.I. in Texas.[56] Florida refused to request extradition, and the defendant was held in federal custody and brought back to Florida for prosecution in the federal court.[57] The court of appeal reversed the trial court’s grant of remission because the surety failed to establish that the federal government would have allowed the defendant to be extradited from Texas for prosecution even if Florida had requested the extradition of the defendant.[58] As the defendant committed new crimes while out on bond, and as the record did not disclose that “but for” Florida’s refusal to request extradition the defendant would have been returned to Collier County, the court of appeal in Clerk of Collier County refused to apply the ruling in Surety Continental Heritage Insurance v. Orange County, 798 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).[59]
Prevention Due to Refusal to Extradite
The appellate opinion in Orange County is precedent for the proposition that when the surety has done all that it could do to gain return of the defendant, and the State of Florida refuses to start extradition proceedings, the surety’s failure to gain return of the defendant is excused.[60] The defendants in Orange County failed to appear and approximately one year later, the surety located them in Jamaica.[61] The issue to be resolved, as framed by the court of appeal, was “[w]hether the trial court erred in denying the motion for remission when the surety located the fugitives in Jamaica, was ready to pay all costs associated with their transport back, the Jamaican police were ready to place them under arrest, but the state attorney refused to initiate extradition proceedings.”[62]
The court of appeal in Orange County reversed the denial of the remission, finding that “the surety did exactly what the statute [§903.28] was designed to encourage.”[63] The defendants in Orange County did not commit additional crimes while out on bond, which was a notable distinction to the appellate court in Clerk of Collier County that refused to apply Orange County.[64]
Canceling the Bond
If no formal charges are brought within 365 days after arrest, the court must order the bond canceled unless good cause is shown by the state.[65] Within 10 business days after the conditions of a bond have been satisfied, the court must order the bond canceled.[66] The conditions of the bond are an adjudication of guilt or innocence, an acquittal, or a withholding of an adjudication of guilt.[67] A general surety bail bond does not apply to appearances after an adjudication of guilt or innocence.[68]
The statute goes on to mandate that the court must order the bond canceled within 10 days of the forfeiture being discharged (under §904.26(5)), or remitted (under §904.28).[69] In contrast, an order vacating or setting aside a forfeiture due to a failure to fulfill the conditions precedent required by §904.26(1) is usually intended to restore the parties to the same position they were in before forfeiture was improvidently entered, and does not authorize the cancellation of the bond.[70]
Although F.S. §903.31 is titled, “Canceling the bond,” the statute also provides that an “original appearance bond shall expire 36 months after the bond has been posted,” provided the bond has not been “declared forfeited before the 36-month expiration.”65 While a cancellation of a bail bond requires action by the court, a bail bond expires solely upon the passage of time, and without court involvement.70
Conclusion
Florida’s bond forfeiture laws play a critical role in ensuring accountability within the criminal justice system. By balancing the rights of defendants with the interests of public safety and judicial efficiency, these laws help maintain the integrity of court proceedings.
[1] The Florida Bar Journal (Feb. 1989) published a helpful guide aimed at informing Florida lawyers about surety bail bond forfeitures, a little-known area of the law, Florida Law of Bail Bond Estreatures by Thomas W. Logue and William X. Candela. The number of attorneys who represent clerks of court or sureties in bail bond forfeiture proceedings that are familiar with this substantive area of the law are few. Many members of The Florida Bar relied upon that article as a necessary guide to navigating the unfamiliar waters of bail bond forfeiture proceedings. That article no longer serves as a dependable guide due to the numerous and extensive amendments to Fla. Stat. Ch. 903, and the pertinent caselaw since 1989. This article intends to fill the void and to serve as updated guidance.
[2] Pinellas County v. Robertson, 490 So. 2d 1041, 1042 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), citing Accredited Surety & Cas. v. State, 383 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
[3] Wiley v. State, 451 So. 2d. 916, 922 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), citing Accredited Surety v. State, 383 So. 2d at 309.
[4] Fla. Stat. §903.26(2).
[5] Fla. Stat. §903.26(2)(b).
[6] Id.
[7] Id.
[8] Fla. Stat. §903.26(2)(a).
[9] Fla. Stat. §903.26(1)(a).
[10] Fla. Stat. §903.26(1)(b).
[11] Accredited Surety & Cas. v. Hagman, 467 So. 2d at 1066-67 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985), and cases cited therein, Allegheney Mut. Ins. Co. v. State, 376 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
[12] Wiley v. State, 451 So. 2d 916, 922 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Fast Release Bail Bonds v. State, 895 So. 2d 448, 450 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).
[13] Fla. Stat. §903.26(6).
[14] Fla. Stat. §903.26(2)(a), (5).
[15] Hillsborough County v. Roche Surety, 805 So. 2d 937 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Frontier Ins. v. State, 760 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); County Bonding v. State, 724 So. 2d 131, 132 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).
[16] Fla. Stat. §903.26(8).
[17] Id.
[18] Singh Bail Bonds v. Brock, 88 So. 3d 960, 963 fn. 7 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); Laws of Fla. Ch. 61-406 53.
[19] Fla. Stat. §903.27(1).
[20] Id.
[21] Fla. Stat. §903.27(3).
[22] Fla. Stat. §903.27(5).
[23] Fla. Stat. §903.27.
[24] See Resolute Ins. v. State, 289 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Ferlita v. State, 380 So. 2d 1118, 1120 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
[25] See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.010; Compare Allied Fidelity Ins. v. State, 499 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
[26] State v. American Bankers Ins. Co., 558 So. 2d 539, 541 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Laws of Fla. Ch. 86-151, §9.
[27] American Bankers, 558 So. 2d at 541.
[28] Id. at 540-41.
[29] Accredited Surety,467 So. 2d at 1066, for cases cited therein standing for this proposition.
[30] Ferlita, 380 So. 2d at 1120; Cardoza v. State, 98 So. 3d 1217 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012).
[31] United Bonding Ins. v. State, 242 S. 2d 140, 143 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970).
[32] Ferlita, 380 So. 2d at 1120; Cardoza, 98 So. 3d at 1220.
[33] Resolute Ins. v. Brinker, 338 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976).
[34] County Bonding v. State, 724 So. 2d 131, 133 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).
[35] Leon County v. Abi-Williams Bonding Agency, 652 So. 2d 464, 466 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), as modified by the holding of Brevard v. Barber Bonding, 860 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).
[36] Clerk of Collier County v. Hernandez, 345 So. 2d 965, 966 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022), quoting Hillsborough Co. v. Roche Sur. & Cas, 805 So. 2d 937, 938-939 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), quoting Fla. Stat. §903.28(7) (1999).
[37] Alleghany Cas. Co. v. State, 850 So. 2d 669, 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), citing Hillsborough Co., 805 So. 2d at 939.
[38] Fla. Stat. §903.26(2)(a); Clerk of the Circuit Court Collier County v. U.S. Specialty Ins., 341 So. 3d 358, 360 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022), citing Roche Sur. & Cas. Co., 805 So. 2d at 939; County of Volusia v. Audet, 682 So. 3d 687 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). See also Harrison v. Leon County Clerk of Circuit Court, 330 So. 3d 100 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021), in which the appellate court inexplicably reads the unambiguous two-year time limit out of the statute. The appellate court erroneously links and makes the two-year time limit dependent upon the requirement that there be no “breach of the bond.” Id. at 102. This error is compounded by the court of appeals interpreting “no breach of the bond” to include a failure of the defendant to appear, rather than limiting the term to a failure to pay the forfeiture within 60 days. The appellate court in Harrison fails to apprehend that every forfeiture results from a defendant’s failure to appear, Fla. Stat. §903.26(2), and that every remission is preceded by a forfeiture. Fla. Stat. §903.28. If a defendant’s failure to appear disqualifies the surety from obtaining a remission, the remedy of remission would be abrogated. If that failure to appear avoids the two-year limit, the time limit is abrogated.
[39] U.S. Specialty Ins., 341 So. 3d at 360. Fla. Stat. §903.28(2)-(6).
[40] Brevard v. Barber Bonding Agency, 860 So. 2d 10, 12 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).
[41] Fla. Stat. §903.28(2)-(6); Clerk of Circuit Court of Collier County v. Hernandez, 345 So. 3d 965 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022); Fireline Bail Bonds, 110 So. 3d at 16 (surety entitled to partial remission based upon its return of defendant to custody of the county sheriff).
[42] Clerk of Collier County, 345 So. 3d at 968.
[43] Fla. Stat. §903.21(3)(b)(2).
[44] Fla. Stat. §903.28(2)(6).
[45] Id.; Morra v. State, 460 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).
[46] County Bonding,724 So. 2d at 133; Morra, 460 So. 3d at 507; see Allied Bonding Agency v. State, 358 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (“we cannot say every disappearance thwarts prosecution”).
[47] Pinellas Co. v. Robertson, 490 So. 2d at 1043, (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).
[48] Accredited Sur. and Cas. v. Putnam Co., 528 So. 2d 430, 431 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988); #1 Anytime Bail v. State, 278 So. 3d 268, 270 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019); Clerk of Circuit Court Collier County, 345 So. 2d at 968.
[49] Fla. Stat. §903.28(8).
[50] Id.
[51] Id.
[52] Palmetto Surety v. State, 148 So. 3d 517, 519 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014), citing Accredited Sur. and Cas., 528 So. 2d at 431.
[53] Fla. Stat. §903.28(2)-(6).
[54] Public Services Mut. Ins. v. State, 135 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961).
[55] Id. at 782, citing Taylor v. Tainter, 83 U.S. 366, 370, 21 L. Ed. 287 (1872).
[56] Hernandez, 345 So. 2d at 966, quoting Hillsborough Co. v. Roche Sur. & Cas, 805 So. 2d 937, 938-939 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), quoting Fla. Stat. §903.28 (7) (1999).
[57] Hernandez, 345 So. 3d at 966.
[58] Id. at 968.
[59] Id.
[60] Orange County, 798 So. 2d at 838.
[61] Id.
[62] Id.
[63] Id.
[64] Hernandez, 345 So. 3d at 968.
[65] Fla. Stat. §903.31(3).
[66] Fla. Stat. §903.31(1).
[67] Id.
[68] Fla. Stat. §903.31(2).
[69] Fla. Stat. §903.31(1).
[70] Wiley, 451 So. 2d 916 at 922; see also Bush v. International Fid. Ins. Co., 834 So. 2d 212, 215-216 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).
Thomas W. Franchino has been legal counsel for Crystal K. Kinzel, Clerk of the Circuit Court and Comptroller for Collier County, since 2000. He received his B.A. from the University of Illinois and his J.D. from the University of Kansas School of Law. He was admitted to the Minnesota State Bar in 1982 and to The Florida Bar in 1987.
