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A Tribute to Justice Arthur J. England, Jr.: Father of Florida’s Modern-day Appellate Judicial Structure

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On August 1, 2013, Arthur J. England, Jr., passed away. His contributions to Florida law are too numerous to list. Select highlights include serving as both special tax counsel to the Florida House of Representatives and consumer adviser and special counsel to Governor Reubin Askew; helping write the Florida Corporate Income Tax Code, the Florida Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and the Florida Administrative Procedure Act; establishing the nation’s first interest on trust accounts program; authoring practice manuals on both Florida administrative and appellate law; and serving as private appellate counsel in numerous cases of statewide importance. Many tributes will surely be written about these, and his many other, contributions to the legal landscape in Florida.

This tribute focuses on one discrete, yet highly significant, accomplishment during his tenure on the Florida Supreme Court. As both justice (1975-77; 1980-81) and chief justice (1978-80), England led the charge in reforming the Florida appellate judicial structure, primarily by restricting the jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court. In 1980, his efforts culminated in an amendment to Fla. Const. art. V, which he then helped fortify. The resulting appellate structure remains largely intact today, more than 30 years later. This article pays tribute to Justice England’s distinguished efforts in this regard.

The 1956 Constitution and the Erosion of its Appellate Structure
From the time Florida achieved statehood in 1845 until 1957, the Florida Supreme Court was the state’s only appellate court. As that court’s caseload inevitably increased, however, so did the delay in the administration of justice. Due in large part to the efforts of Justice Elwyn Thomas, the people responded in 1956 by amending Fla. Const. art. V, which, upon taking effect in July 1957, created the district courts of appeal.1 Interpreting this amendment shortly thereafter, the Florida Supreme Court recognized that it was founded on “the idea of a Supreme Court which functions as a supervisory body in the judicial system for the [s]tate, exercising appellate power in certain specified areas essential to the settlement of issues of public importance and the preservation of uniformity of principle and practice, with review by the district courts in most instances being final and absolute.”2

Despite this recognition, during the next 15 years, the court, in certain instances, allowed itself to become a second court of plenary appellate review rather than a supervisory body.3 Contrary to the purpose of the 1956 amendment, this had the effect of transforming the district courts into mere “way stations on the road to the Supreme Court,”4 increasing rather than ameliorating the court’s caseload.

The primary example of this phenomenon involved the court’s “conflict jurisdiction.” In order to preserve uniformity in the law, the 1956 Constitution granted the Supreme Court discretionary jurisdiction to review decisions of the district courts that were in “direct conflict” with a decision of another district court or a decision of the Supreme Court. The issue soon arose whether such conflict could be created by a per curiam district court decision that simply affirmed the trial court without written opinion. The issue was important because the district courts were issuing such per curiam affirmances (PCAs) to handle their heavy caseload and resolve appeals requiring the application of settled law.

While the Florida Supreme Court initially resolved that issue in the negative,5 it reversed course in 1965, holding in Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 177 So. 2d 221, 225 (Fla. 1965), that it could look into the “record proper” behind a PCA in order to determine whether it had conflict jurisdiction. In reaching that conclusion, the court emphasized the importance of maintaining uniformity in the law, but questionably asserted that a PCA had not only the same legal, but also the same precedential, effect as a district court decision supported by a written opinion.6 In a dissenting opinion, Justice B. Campbell Thornal predicted that the majority’s opinion would serve as “an open invitation to every litigant who loses in the [d]istrict [c]ourt to come on up to the Supreme Court and be granted a second appeal — the very thing that many feared would happen — and the very thing which we assured the people of this state would not happen when the judiciary article was amended in 1956.”7

Justice Thornal’s prediction proved accurate. Indeed, five years later, Justice Thornal, in another dissenting opinion, attributed the court’s rising caseload to Foley, accusing the court of “mysteriously find[ing] some conflict” if it thought the “[d]istrict [c]ourt of [a]ppeal reached the wrong conclusion,” and cautioning that “if this Court keeps finding ‘direct conflict’ at the rate we are moving, [then] in a relatively short time the [d]istrict [c]ourt of [a]ppeal will cease to be courts of final jurisdiction as intended by our [c]onstitution.”8 Despite this warning, judicial reform efforts in the early 1970s did not restrict the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, and the court attempted to handle its growing backlog administratively rather than structurally.9

Justice England’s Arrival and Pre-amendment Efforts
Justice England quickly recognized the problem when he arrived in 1975. During his first two years on the court, he wrote numerous concurring and dissenting opinions persistently calling for the reconsideration and, ultimately, the abrogation of Foley.10 In doing so, he emphasized, like Justice Thornal before him, that “[w]here our Court has no law-harmonizing or precedent-developing function, our intercession for a second full plenary review merely erodes the constitutional finality of our district courts.”11

Justice England’s critique of Foley culminated in a fierce concurring opinion in Florida Greyhound, Etc. v. West Flagler Association, 347 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1977). He explained that, “[a]fter pondering this question for some time,” he had “conclude[d] that the time has indeed come to recede from Foley and its ill-conceived attempt to retain the last word on every matter brought to the Florida appellate courts.”12 Justice England set forth his reasoning at length, of which the following passage offers a glimpse:

In my view, the premise articulated by the Foley majority is in all events manifestly unsound. It is based on the indefensible assumption that trial judges assume that district courts issue per curiam affirmances only when they agree with the trial judge’s reasons for ruling a certain way. That assumption is not only fallacious as a matter of simple logic, but it has, since Foley , been expressly rejected by the district courts themselves…. Since Foley , as I have attempted to point out, the district courts have more and more been regarded by a majority of this Court simply as inconvenient rungs on the appellate ladder. The high cost of Foley in dollars and time to litigants and to the judiciary of Florida now demands that the majority decision there be reconsidered. My own conviction is that Foley should be scrapped…. To my mind, there is no possible way that a district court’s affirmance without opinion can create decisional disharmony in the jurisprudence of this state sufficient to warrant our attention. The foul assumption which underlies any review is that the district court perpetrated an injustice which it could not explain away in an opinion. I refuse to indulge that assumption.

In addition to writing many separate opinions passionately calling for restrictive jurisdiction, which extended beyond the Foley context,13 Justice England also found time to co-author a study for Judicature. Published the same month as his concurring opinion in Florida Greyhound, Justice England and his co-author argued that the court’s heavy caseload threatened the quality of justice.14 To do so, they empirically studied the court’s workload from July 1975 to June 1976 and estimated that “the job of dispensing justice requires about [14] hours of each of the 240 working days of each year. Or, using each of the 365 days in a year to perform the work, it would require more than nine hours of labor each day. Or, at the work rate of eight hours each day, these tasks would require 415 days a year.”15

Chief Justice England’s Push for Reform
Justice England’s jurisdictional opinions and Judicature article laid the groundwork for reform. Although other justices occasionally joined his opinions, they never came together to form a majority.16 Thus, Justice England sought structural (rather than decisional) change when he became chief justice in the summer of 1978. Earlier that year, then Chief Justice Ben Overton recommended in his report to the legislature the creation of a commission to determine the need for an additional district court and to consider shifting workers’ compensation appeals from the Supreme Court to the district court. When Justice England became chief justice, he implemented that recommendation by appointing a broad-based Appellate Structure Commission, chaired by Justice Overton. Most significantly, however, Chief Justice England “expanded the scope of the commission’s inquiry…to include a review of the entire appellate system in light of the 1956 goal to ensure that the district courts of appeal are courts of final appellate review as contemplated by Article V of the Constitution.”17

That expansion greased the wheels of change. The commission met continuously, conducted hearings, and gathered statistics over a period of eight months. The commission set forth a number of recommendations for restricting the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, many of which the court endorsed. Critically, however, the court rejected the commission’s recommendation to restrict the court’s jurisdiction by statute and rule, insisting instead that this be accomplished in the form of a constitutional amendment.18 In his May 1979 report to the legislature, Chief Justice England was emphatic on this point:

The court has unanimously resolved that its jurisdictional problems should not be ameliorated with tentative solutions, but that they should be confronted directly and dealt with definitively. To meet these problems, the justices of the Supreme Court recommend that the legislature adopt an amendment to Article V, §3 of the Florida Constitution. . . , and that this amendment be submitted to the people of the [s]tate of Florida not later than the presidential primary election to be held in March 1980.19

The unanimity is particularly striking given that, only two years earlier, Justice England was rebuking his colleagues in Florida Greyhound for their continued adherence to Foley.

Under Chief Justice England’s leadership, the court further spurred progress by proposing a draft amendment. That proposal triggered months of debate among members of the court, the Florida House and Senate judiciary committees, the Appellate Structure Commission, The Florida Bar, the American Bar Association, and various interested constituencies. In November 1979, the language of an amendment was agreed upon, and the Florida House and Senate overwhelmingly approved it, along with a bill authorizing its accelerated consideration at the election of March 1980.20 In the intervening months, six of the seven justices, the governor, the attorney general, and the organized bar campaigned in favor of the amendment, which was ultimately approved by 67 percent of the voters.21

The amendment significantly restricted the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. Among other things, it limited the categories of cases within the court’s mandatory jurisdiction, limited the cases that could be appealed directly from the trial courts to the Supreme Court, and limited the scope of the court’s discretionary jurisdiction. Most notably, on the latter point, the amendment inserted the word “expressly” to modify the court’s conflict jurisdiction in an attempt to overrule Foley and preclude conflict jurisdiction over silent PCAs.22 In short, the amendment vindicated Justice England’s efforts to restore and strengthen the appellate judicial structure envisioned by the 1956 Constitution, limiting the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to designated cases of statewide importance and empowering the district courts to otherwise act as courts of final appellate review.

Justice England’s Post-amendment Efforts
Despite securing significant constitutional restrictions on the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, Chief Justice England did not stop there. Shortly after the passage of the amendment, he, along with his administrative assistant and research aide, published a comprehensive article in the University of Florida Law Review, titled “Constitutional Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Florida: 1980 Reform.”23 The article recounted the history, drafting, and passage of the amendment, reviewed all of its provisions, analyzed how those provisions interacted with existing law, identified unresolved issues, recommended how to implement aspects of the amendment, and attached key historical documents.24 This seminal article remains a key source of authority on the Florida Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisdiction, and it continues to be cited by the Florida courts and scholars.25

But Chief Justice England recognized that there was an immediate need to document the 1980 amendment. Indeed, he and his co-authors wrote: “Principal responsibility for the success or failure of the intended changes…rests squarely on the seven members of the Florida Supreme Court. Their construction and application of the amendment, particularly in its formative years, will either realize or frustrate the voters’ hopes for a new day in Florida appellate justice.”26

The court interpreted the amendment shortly after it took effect. Relying on the word “expressly,” the court held in Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356, 1359 (Fla. 1980), that it lacked conflict jurisdiction over unelaborated PCAs (regardless of whether they were accompanied by a concurring or dissenting opinion). This decision effectively overruled Foley and its progeny, just as the 1980 amendment had intended. Chief Justice England wrote a special concurrence, excerpting the historical account of the amendment from his then-forthcoming Florida Law Review article.27 Only a week later, the court issued a trilogy of cases extending Jenkins to PCAs containing only citations.28 During the last few decades, the Supreme Court has, with limited exceptions,29 relied on these formative cases to find a lack of jurisdiction over PCAs in a wide variety of legal and factual contexts.30

With Foley abrogated, Justice England capped off his jurisdictional efforts as a member of the court in 1981 by publishing yet another law review article, this time in the Florida State University Law Review.31 Co-authored with his research aide, the article comprehensively “analyze[d] the [S]upreme [C]ourt’s first year of operation under the 1980 amendment,” “evaluate[d] the performance of the amendment in light of its objectives,” “focuse[d] on statistical and decisional developments in each aspect of the court’s mandatory and discretionary jurisdiction affected by the 1980 amendment,” “reference[d] all relevant changes in the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure,” and “identifie[d] some unanswered questions concerning the amendment.”32 Despite acknowledging that one year was not sufficient time to measure the effect of the amendment, the authors reported that there had been a “dramatic drop in the number of cases filed with the [S]upreme [C]ourt,” “giant strides toward eliminating the unmanageable backlog of cases that had built up,” and a significant reduction in the amount of time expended in disposing of petitions for discretionary review.33 Shortly after this article was published, Justice England resigned from the court. Although he cited family and financial reasons,34 he could have just as easily asserted that his (jurisdictional) work there was done.35

Justice England’s jurisdictional efforts are praiseworthy for several reasons. First, and most simply, they were jurisprudentially sound, in that they sought to restore the appellate structure that had been designed by the 1956 Constitution but eroded by the court.

Second, that appellate structure was not only mandated by the constitution, but it was sound as a matter of judicial administration. exercising plenary appellate review over the majority of cases, the district courts would fulfill the error-correction function of appellate courts and administer justice in individual cases. Investing the district courts with such authority would mitigate the Supreme Court’s unmanageable caseload and the costs and delay that came with it. That reduction in caseload would allow the court to devote its finite resources to the cases truly presenting issues of statewide or public importance.

Third, Justice England selflessly, yet vigorously, sought to relinquish authority of the institution on which he personally served in order to promote the public good. Indeed, the constitutional amendment of 1980 effectively transferred substantial authority from the Supreme Court to the district courts.

Finally, Justice England’s jurisdictional efforts did much to repair the integrity of the court. When he arrived in 1975, the court was still reeling from multiple scandals implicating several members of the court.36 While not one of the primary scandals, an investigation revealed that one of the implicated justices used the Foley doctrine to find conflict jurisdiction “in [10] of [11] successive cases [involving a campaign supporter] at a time when 85 percent of petitions overall were being turned down.”37 This revelation, along with the other severe (albeit nonjurisdictional) incidents of misconduct, cried out for structural reform and judicial self-restraint at the court. Justice England’s jurisdictional efforts — and the resulting 1980 constitutional amendment reining in the court’s jurisdiction — fit that prescription.

To be sure, Justice England does not deserve all of the credit. Justice Thomas, the “father of Florida’s District Courts of Appeal,”38 played an instrumental role in lobbying for the 1956 constitutional amendment,39 which established the structural foundation. Likewise, in the years following the 1956 Constitution, Justices Thomas and Thornal wrote several opinions dissenting from permissive jurisdictional holdings, which would later support Justice England’s reform efforts. As chief justice, Ben Overton proposed what would ultimately become the Appellate Structure Commission; he served as the chair of that commission, joined several of Justice England’s jurisdictional opinions,40 and wrote a few of his own.41 Likewise, Justice Alan Sundberg played a key role in the 1980 amendment process, representing the court in the negotiations, and he subsequently authored the opinion in Jenkins.42 and, of course, countless members of the legislature, Appellate Structure Commission, Florida Bar committee, and various constituencies helped draft the amendment and facilitate its adoption by the people. But, in the end, between his many concurring and dissenting opinions calling for restrictive jurisdiction, his bold expansion of the Appellate Structure Commission’s inquiry, his insistence on structural reform in the form of a constitutional amendment, and his comprehensive law review articles chronicling the amendment and guiding its prospective interpretation, few did more to contribute to Florida’s modern-day appellate judicial structure than Justice Arthur England.

1 See Jack R. Reiter, Florida’s District Courts of Appeal: Their Creation and Evolution, Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal: Balancing Justice 74-79 (Kathleen M. O’Connor & Edward G. Guedes eds. 2007) (recounting the 1956 constitutional amendment).

2 Ansin v. Thurston, 101 So. 2d 808, 810 (Fla. 1958).

3 See, e.g., Harrell’s Candy Kitchen, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Air. Auth., 111 So. 2d 439, 441-42 (Fla. 1959); Evans v. Carroll, 104 So. 2d 375, 377 (1958).

4 Lake v. Lake, 103 So. 2d 639, 642 (Fla. 1958).

5 Id. at 643.

6 See Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 177 So. 2d 221, 223-26 (Fla. 1965).

7 Id. at 234-35 (Thornal, J., dissenting).

8 Gibson v. Maloney, 231 So. 2d 823, 832-33 (Fla. 1970) (Thornal, J., dissenting).

9 Arthur J. England, Jr., et al., Constitutional Jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court: 1980 Reform, 32 Fla. L. Rev. 147, 153 (1980). In fact, a 1972 amendment to the constitution expanded the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction by granting it discretionary jurisdiction to resolve decisional conflict within a single district. Such intra-conflict jurisdiction was subsequently removed by the 1980 amendment. See Taylor Mattis, Stare Decisis Among and Within Florida’s District Courts of Appeal, 18 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 143, 153 n.57, 163-64 (1990).

10 See Fla. Greyhound, Etc. v. West Flagler Ass’n, 347 So. 2d 408, 408-12 (Fla. 1977) (England, J., concurring); Williams v. State, 340 So. 2d 113, 116 (Fla. 1976) (England, J., dissenting); City of Jacksonville v. Fla. Nat’l Bank, 339 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1976) (England, J., concurring); Nat’l Airlines v. Edwards, 336 So. 2d 545, 547 (Fla. 1976) (England, J., dissenting); Golden Loaf Bakery, Inc. v. Charles W. Rex Constr. Co., 334 So. 2d 585, 586 (Fla. 1976) (England, J., concurring); Carter v. State, 331 So. 2d 293, 294 (Fla. 1976) (England, J., concurring); Cummings v. Cummings, 330 So. 2d 134, 137 (Fla. 1976) (England, J., dissenting); Hollywood Beach Hotel Co. v. City of Hollywood, 329 So. 2d 10, 18 (Fla. 1976) (England, J., dissenting); Hunt v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 327 So. 2d 193, 196 (Fla. 1976) (England, J., dissenting); State v. Embry, 322 So. 2d 515, 518 (Fla. 1975) (England, J., dissenting).

11 Williams, 340 So. 2d at 116 (England, J., dissenting); see also Edwards, 336 So. 2d at 548 (England, J., dissenting); Golden Loaf Bakery, 334 So. 2d at 587 n.8 (England, J., concurring).

12 Fla. Greyhound, 347 So. 2d at 409 (England, J., concurring).

13 See, e.g., Cross v. State, 374 So. 2d 519, 521 (Fla. 1979) (England, C.J., concurring specially); Johnson v. State, 351 So. 2d 10, 14 (1977) (England, J., dissenting); Johnson v. State, 351 So. 2d 10, 14 (1977) (England, J., dissenting).

14 See Arthur J. England, Jr. & Michael P. McMahon, Quantity Discounts in Appellate Justice, 60
Judicature 442 (1977).

15 Id. at 450.

16 See Arthur J. England, Jr., et al., Constitutional Jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court: 1980 Reform, 32 Fla. L. Rev. 147, 179 n.183 (1980).

17 Id. at 153-54 (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted).

18 Id. at 154-55.

19 Arthur J. England, Jr., 1979 Report on the Florida Judiciary, 53 Fla. B. J. 296, 299 (May 1979).

20 See Arthur J. England, Jr., et al., Constitutional Jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court: 1980 Reform, 32 Fla. L. Rev. 147, 155-59 (1980).

21 See id. at 159-60.

22 Id. at 176-81.

23 Arthur J. England, Jr., et al., Constitutional Jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court: 1980 Reform, 32 Fla. L. Rev. 147, 153 (1980). An abridged version of the article was published in The Florida Bar Journal. Arthur J. England, Jr., et al. , An Analysis of the 1980 Jurisdictional Amendment, 54 Fla. B. J. 406 (1980).

24 See Arthur J. England, Jr., et al., Constitutional Jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court: 1980 Reform, 32 Fla. L. Rev. 147, 149 (1980).

25 See, e.g., Fla. Power & Light v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 31 So. 3d 860, 863 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Diana L. Martin & Robin I. Bresky, Taking the Pathway of Discretionary Review Toward Florida’s Highest Court, 83 Fla. B. J. 55, 55 n.2 (2009); Harry Lee Anstead, et al., The Operation and Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Florida, 29 Nova L. Rev. 431, 434 n.3, 481 n.223 (2005).

26 Arthur J. England, Jr., et al., Constitutional Jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court: 1980 Reform, 32 Fla. L. Rev. 147, 149 (1980).

27 Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356, 1360-63 (Fla. 1980) (England, C.J., concurring specially).

28 Robles Del Mar, Inc. v. Town of Indian River Shores, 385 So. 2d 1371 (Fla. 1980); Pena v. Tampa Fed. Savings & Loan Ass’n, 385 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 1980); Dodi Publishing Co. v. Editorial Am., SA, 385 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1980).

29 See, e.g., Stupak v. Winter Park Leasing, Inc., 585 So. 2d 283, 283 (1991); Jollie v. State, 405 So. 2d 418 (1981); see also Thomas C. Marks, Jr., Jurisdiction Creep and the Florida Supreme Court, 69 Alb. L. Rev. 543, 549-51 (2006).

30 See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 926 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 2006); Byrd v. State, 880 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 2004); Persaud v. State, 838 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 2003); Stallworth v. Moore, 827 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 2002); Grate v. State, 750 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1999); Reaves v. State, 485 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 1986).

31 Arthur J. England, Jr. & Richard C. Williams, Jr., Florida Appellate Reform One Year Later, 9 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 221 (1981). An abridged version was again published in The Florida Bar Journal. Arthur J. England, Jr. & Richard C. Williams, Jr., Florida Appellate Reform: One Year Later, 55 Fla. B. J. 704 (1981).

32 Id. at 223.

33 Id. at 224, 226, 255-56.

34 Justice Arthur England Resigns, Cites Family, Financial Reasons, Gainesville Sun, June 16, 1981, at 14A.

35 Justice England continued to write in this area long after his resignation from the court. In 2004, he wrote an article for The Florida Bar Journal about a new rule of appellate procedure pertaining to PCAs, for which he received the Journal ’s annual Excellence in Writing Award. Arthur J. England, Jr., PCAs in the DCAs: Asking for Written Opinion From a Court That Has Decided Not to Write One, 78 Fla. B. J. 10 (2004); England Takes Home Journal Writing Award, Fla. B. News, July 15, 2005.

36 See generally Martin A. Dyckman, A Most Disorderly Court: Scandal and Reform in the Florida Judiciary (2008); Martin A. Dyckman, How Florida Accepted Merit Retention: Nothing Succeeds Quite Like a Scandal, 64 Fla. L. Rev. F. 1 (2012).

37 Martin A. Dyckman, A Most Disorderly Court: Scandal and Reform in the Florida Judiciary 159 (2008).

38 Reiter, Florida’s District Courts of Appeal: Their Creation and Evolution, Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal: Balancing Justice at 75, 85 (quoting Jollie v. State, 405 So. 2d 418, 420 (Fla. 1981)).

39 Fla. State Courts, Brief Description of the District Courts,

40 See, e.g., Fla. Greyhound, Etc. v. West Flagler Ass’n, 347 So. 2d 408, 408 (Fla. 1977) (England, J., concurring); Williams v. State, 340 So. 2d 113, 116 (Fla. 1976) (England, J., dissenting); City of Jacksonville v. Fla. Nat’l Bank, 339 So. 2d 632, 632 (Fla. 1976) (England, J., concurring); Nat’l Airlines v. Edwards, 336 So. 2d 545, 547 (Fla. 1976) (England, J., dissenting).

41 See, e.g., Fla. Greyhound, 347 So. 2d at 412 (Overton, C.J., concurring specially); Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 315 So. 2d 451, 459-60 (1975) (Overton, J., dissenting).

42 Arthur J. England, Jr., et al., Constitutional Jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court: 1980 Reform, 32 Fla. L. Rev. 147, 155-57 (1980).

Andrew L. Adler is an associate in the Ft. Lauderdale office of Boies, Schiller & Flexner, LLP.

This column is submitted on behalf of the Appellate Practice Section, Caryn Lynn Bellus, chair; Brandon Christian, editor, and Chris McAdams and Kristi Rothell, assistant editors.

Appellate Practice