Case Note: Local Ordinances Can Provide Meaningful Access for Workers to a Broad Just Cause Standard for Dismissal
Employment “at-will” provides maximum workplace flexibility for employers in exercising managerial discretion over employees.[1] An individual is classified as at-will if the employee is hired for an indefinite duration and may quit, or be fired, at any time, with or without notice.[2] At-will employment also allows employers to adjust the terms of employment with employees at any time, for any reason, and without legal consequences. Within the U.S., state courts articulate exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine on a case-by-case basis. This procedural framework provides little stability or predictability in the workplace. Employers and employees are subject to the vagaries of state court determinations, which this author believes contravenes principles of procedural fairness and workplace democracy, which have always been present when a collective bargaining representative advocates for its members in the workplace.
The at-will regime places employees at risk and largely discourages employees from making internal complaints regarding suspect or perceived inequitable policies and procedures. That discouragement is based on the reasonable fear of termination without cause consistent with the at-will doctrine. A “just cause” standard for dismissal would, in contrast, provide more predictability in the workplace for both employers and employees, and would serve to eliminate the vagaries of state court determinations in evaluating employees’ complaints for wrongful termination and retaliation.
Under the at-will regime, it may be virtually impossible for employees to prove a legal violation as an exception to employment at-will, since employers remain the custodians of the essential information. In contrast, just cause protections shift the applicable burden of proof from the employee to the employer. Under a just cause standard, the employer may only discipline or discharge an employee for a legitimate, provable reason.
This article examines the legal landscape of the at-will employment regulatory scheme compared to a just cause requirement[3] in the context of state and municipal statutes, which have carved out specific exceptions to the at-will regime to provide a greater degree of employee protection under a just cause standard. Local governments implement such ordinances to protect vulnerable workforce populations from economic hardships caused by substandard working conditions, abusive workplace practices, and pervasive unjustified firings.[4] Such local statutes have survived preemption challenges under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), as well as legal challenges under the Dormant Commerce Clause.[5]
Local statutes and ordinances that impose no restriction on the employees’ right to self-organization and the consequent facilitation of collective bargaining are not preempted by the NLRA.[6] New York City has become, in effect, a laboratory for societal experimentation of such local ordinances. New York City has implemented local ordinances that provide job security for vulnerable working populations under a just cause standard.[7] Such protections are particularly important for fast-food workers, since they are especially susceptible to unjustified terminations, contributing to homelessness and other barriers that prevent them from entering other sectors of the labor force.
Additional protections for workers may also be found in certain state regulatory regimes, where certain supervisory positions in the public sector are given increased procedural protections against termination. For example, the police chief, fire department head, and building officials are granted additional procedural protection for job security through state statutes, even though the state remains “at-will” for all other positions in both the public and private sectors.[8]
The State Backdrop for the Use of the Just Cause Standard
Montana is the only state[9] that is not an at-will employment state. Montana enforces a “good cause” standard for terminating employment.[10] However, beginning on October 1, 2023, employees in Montana have an automatic probationary period during their first 12 months of employment, during which an employer may terminate the employee at-will with the broadest discretion when making that determination, even regarding the employment status of a manager or a supervisor.[11]
Other State Laws Have Carved Out Exceptions for the At-Will Regime, Infusing a Just Cause Standard
Other states have carved out just cause[12] exceptions to employment at-will through enacting specific statutory remedies for public employees. The statutory language contained in Connecticut General Statute §7-278,[13] for example, provides for the imposition of just cause principles in the dismissal of a police chief. The statute, in relevant part, states:
No active head of any police department of any town, city or borough shall be dismissed unless there is a showing of just cause[14] by the authority having the power of dismissal and such person has been given notice in writing of the specific grounds for such dismissal and an opportunity to be heard in his [or her] own defense, personally, or by counsel, at a public hearing before such authority. Such public hearing, unless otherwise specified by charter, shall be held not less than five nor more than [10] days after such notice. Any person so dismissed may appeal within [30] days following such dismissal to superior court for the judicial district in which such town, city or borough is located. Service shall be made as in civil process. Said court shall review the record of such hearing and if it appears upon the hearing [on] the appeal that testimony is necessary for an equitable disposition of the appeal, it may take evidence or appoint a referee or a committee to take such evidence as it directs and report the same to the court with his or its findings of fact, which report shall constitute a part of the proceedings upon which the determination of the court shall be made. The court, upon such appeal, and after hearing thereon, may affirm the action of such authority, or may set the same aside if it finds that such authority acted illegally or arbitrarily in the abuse of its discretion, with bad faith malice, or without just cause.[15]
In December of 2020, the New York City Council amended the city’s Fair Workweek Law to provide additional substantive legal protections for workers employed in the fast-food industry. Such amendments enacted the Wrongful Discharge of Fast Food Employees law (the law), which took effect on July 4, 2021,[16] and protects employees of large fast-food restaurant chains in New York City from arbitrary terminations and reductions in hours in the absence of employee misconduct or a bona fide economic reason.[17] Further, the local statute provides procedural protection for redressing employer violations through arbitration.[18]
The law applies only to employers governed by the Fair Workweek Law and merely provides minimum procedural protections to fast-food chain workers. As such, the law has no impact on the mandate of the NLRA to regulate collective bargaining or labor negotiations. In fact, the law[19] enacts a minimum labor standard, which is fully compatible with the purpose of the NLRA’s avowed purpose to restore the equality of bargaining power between workers and employers.
There are two central components of the law: the Just Cause Provision and the Arbitration Provision. The Just Cause Provision provides that a “fast food employer shall not discharge a fast food employee who has completed the applicable period of probation, except for just cause or for a bona fide economic reason.”[20] A discharge is defined as “any cessation of employment, including layoff, termination, constructive discharge, reduction in hours and an indefinite suspension.”[21] A reduction in hours means a “reduction in a fast food employee’s hours of work totaling at least 15[%] of the employee’s regular schedule or 15[%] of any weekly work schedule.”[22] Just cause is defined as “the fast food employee’s failure to satisfactorily perform job duties or misconduct that is demonstrably and materially harmful to the fast food employer’s legitimate business interests.”[23] In determining whether an employee was indeed discharged for just cause, a fact finder must consider five factors enumerated in the law, including an employer’s use of a progressive discipline policy.[24]
Moreover, the employer must supply the former employee with a written explanation containing “the precise reasons for their discharge,” within five days of the discharge.[25] However, there is an exception to the just cause requirement if the fast-food employer has a “bona fide economic reason” to lay off employees or reduce employees’ hours by more than 15%.[26] To properly establish this exception, an employer must show, through the presentation of business records, that business operational changes are “in response to a reduction in volume of production, sales, or profit.”[27]
Furthermore, previously under New York City’s Fair Workweek Law, there were two enforcement procedures: 1) An employee could file an administrative complaint with the New York City Department of Consumer and Worker Protection;[28] or 2) the employee could bring a private cause of action in court.[29]
The law’s Arbitration Provision adds a third option, providing that “any person or organization representing persons alleging a violation” of the law may initiate an arbitration proceeding.[30] Following the employee’s selection of the arbitration option, the arbitration proceeding becomes the exclusive remedy at the disposal of the employee, precluding a private cause of action or the initiation of an administrative complaint unless the “arbitration proceeding has been withdrawn and or it has been dismissed with prejudice.”[31]
An employee who is successful at the arbitration proceeding is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs, as well as reinstatement to work, and/or restoration of hours, and “all other appropriate equitable relief,” including “such other compensatory damages or injunctive relief as may be appropriate.”[32] Moreover, either party can petition for judicial review of the outcome of the arbitration proceeding.[33]
In Restaurant Law Center v. City of New York, 90 F.4th 101 (2d Cir. 2024), two restaurant trade associations argued that New York City’s just cause statute for restaurant workers was preempted by the NLRA because it sought to regulate conduct, which Congress declared to be exclusively a federal responsibility. In Restaurant Law Center, the district court determined that the NLRA did not preempt the law, because the local law is a “validly enacted minimum labor standard.”[34] The district court further reasoned that under the NLRA, states retain the inherent authority to regulate substantive labor standards, and the law does not preclude covered employees from engaging in lockouts or other means of concerted activity.[35] In addition, the district court reasoned that unions are not favored by the law, because unionized and non-union employers are both affected by the law.[36] The district court also concluded that the law did not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause, reasoning that “the [l]aw does not benefit in-state restaurant chains ‘at the expense of out-of-state competitors,’” because only those establishments operating within the city are impacted by the law.[37]
On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ claims that attacked the law under NLRA preemption and under the Dormant Commerce Clause.[38] Focusing on Congress’ determination that the NLRA safeguards the rights of employees to organize and bargain collectively, the court found it necessary to address “[t]he inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association.”[39] The Second Circuit also pointed out that the NLRA does not include an express preemption provision to occupy the entire field of labor management relations.[40] Since the law did not explicitly impact self-organization for employees and collective bargaining, preemption was not implicated, nor was the Dormant Commerce Clause implicated under the so-called Machinists preemption.[41]
The Second Circuit observed that the Machinists preemption[42] doctrine does not bar state and local governments from enacting laws that provide substantive employment protections if such protections do not directly impact the right to bargain or self-organization.[43] The Second Circuit concluded that the law merely facilitates local employee protections without impacting the right to employee self-organization and or collective bargaining.[44] The critical point in the Second Circuit’s analysis is that the law applies to union and non-union workforces alike and does not impact the collective activity of workers.
To summarize, the NLRA leaves intact states’ broad police power authority to regulate substantive labor standards, which serve as the backdrop for employment negotiations governed by federal law. That is because “[t]he NLRA is concerned primarily with establishing an equitable process for determining terms and conditions of employment….”[45] So, “[n]o incompatibility exists…between [the NLRA]…and state or federal legislation that imposes minimal substantive requirements on contract terms negotiated between parties to labor agreements.”[46]
Per the Supreme Court in Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985), minimum labor standards permitted by Machinists are regulations that mandate benefits that “affect union and non-union employees equally[,]” “neither encourage nor discourage the collective bargaining process[,]” and have only “the most indirect effect on the right of self-organization….”[47] In short, the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court have made clear that minimum labor standards dictating specific terms of employment are not preempted under Machinists, provided that they do not put a thumb on either labor or management in the bargaining process.[48]
Similarly, the Second Circuit in Restaurant Law Center concluded that the law did not violate the U.S. Constitution’s Dormant Commerce Clause, which seeks to prevent economic protectionism measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors. As the Second Circuit explained:
States retain “broad power to regulate their own affairs, even if they bear adversely upon interstate commerce.” H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 531-32 (1949). And courts are not to wield the Dormant Commerce Clause as “a roving license…to decide what activities are appropriate for state and local government to undertake.” United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 343 (2007) (Gorsuch, J., plurality opinion) (quoting United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 343 (2007).[49]
In the enactment of the law,[50] the Second Circuit recognized that fast-food workers are particularly vulnerable to inequitable dismissal, and that the effects of wrongful discharge are widespread in the fast-food industry, which employs some 67,000 workers at approximately 30,000 establishments in New York City. The law was enacted with a broad societal purpose and with an intention to protect vulnerable employees who may suffer from homelessness and food insecurity resulting from pervasive inequitable and unjustified workplace terminations.
This author believes local regulation and imposition of the just cause standard in a broader statewide work environment is both laudable and workable from a societal and policy perspective, even when at-will employment remains as the default position.
[1] Over 40 years ago, Prof. Clyde W. Summers, of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, posed the question as to why non-unionized employees are still subject to the employment at-will doctrine, given the universal acceptance of collective bargaining agreements. See Clyde W. Summers, Introduction, 16 Mich. J. L. Reform 201 (1983). He analyzed employment at-will as an agrarian relic, similar to the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s 1974 analysis in Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co. 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974), where a woman who was first demoted and then discharged because she refused to date her foreman was awarded damages by the lower court. The court analogized the employment at-will doctrine to the rejected tenancy at-will doctrine as “based on an ancient feudal system.” Id. at 551. Moreover, the U.S. stands alone among industrial democracies in our failure to enact comprehensive just cause dismissal statutes. See Janice Ballace, Clyde W. Summers, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 615 (1990).
[2] In the U.S., three principal exceptions have emerged as the main exceptions to the default, at-will doctrine. First, the public policy exception, which prevents employers from firing employees for behavior which contributes to the public good. An action seeking damages for discharge of employment in contravention of public policy was recognized in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980). Second, the good faith exception, which prevents employers from firing an employee to intentionally deprive them of a public benefit, such as a pension. An employer may incur liability under this exception where employers would unjustly benefit financially by depriving employees of future compensation for past services, as distinguished from future income due to future services. See McCone v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 471 N.E.2d 47 (Mass. 1984). Third, the implied contract exception, which prevents an employer from firing an employee after the employer implicitly suggests that it would not do so. This exception may apply based on policies contained in an employee manual addressing discipline or the termination of employment and may, under some circumstances, serve as the basis for claims of either a breach of implied contract, or promissory estoppel. See Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 708, 711-12 (Colo. 1987).
[3] Just cause is not an obvious legal concept. It is often written into collective bargaining agreements, even when the term is not explicitly contained in the labor contract. Arbitrators frequently use the term, as a term of art in a conclusory fashion. For example, “reasonable” discipline is permissible, but “arbitrary,” “excessive,” or “discriminatory” disciplines are not. A penalty that is not just under all of the circumstances is set aside. See Roger I. Abrams and Dennis Nolan, Toward A Theory of “Just Cause” in Employee Discipline Cases, 1985 Duke L. J. 594. (1985).
[4] See Restaurant Law Center v. City of New York, 90 F.4th 101, 122 (2d Cir. 2024).
[5] Id. at 101. In the case under analysis here, the plaintiffs primarily relied on the 11th Circuit Case, Cachia v. Islamorada, 542 F.3d 839 (11th Cir. 2008), which held that a city zoning law prohibiting the operation of a chain of local restaurants had the “practical effect of discriminating against interstate commerce.” Id. at 121. See also Id. at 843. However, the Second Circuit held that the New York Wrongful Discharge Law and the law in Cachia were not compatible, and that the New York law was more circumscribed, since competition is not limited, and as such, franchises and chain retailers are not prohibited from operating in the local market. Id. at 121-122.
[6] See id. at 111-113.
[7] In addition to the New York City experience with a just cause standard, for fast-food workers, as we will explain more fully below, Miami-Dade County enacted a municipal ordinance in 1981, which covers the suspension, dismissal and reduction in grade of county employees. Miami-Dade, Fla., Code of Ord. Ch. 2, art. IV, div. 2, §2-47 (2024). A hearing examiner is appointed by the personnel director to determine if the employee’s conduct was not consistent with the efficiency of the county service. The hearing examiner merely makes a recommendation, subject to the final decision of the county manager. The decision of the county manager can then be appealed in accordance with Florida appellate rules.
[8] E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. §§7-278, 7-302 (2023).
[9] Ironically, the Montana statute was passed with the support of Montana employers who advocated for more predictability in employee relations, beginning in 1987, since employers previously faced the unpredictability of state court decisions, without any standard statutory mandate. Senate Judiciary Comm., Discussion of H.B. 241, 50th Mont. Leg. (Mar. 10, 1987); see also M. Scott Regan, Tonack v. Montana Bank: Preemption, Interpretation, and Older Employees Under Montana’s Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, 56 Mont. L. Rev. 585, 588 (1995).
[10] See Mont. Code Ann. §§39-2-903 (2023), et seq. Passed in 1987, the Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act sets forth certain rights and remedies with respect to wrongful discharge. Mont. Code Ann. §§39-2-903 (2023), et seq. The statute declares a discharge wrongful if: 1) it was in retaliation for the employee’s refusal to violate public policy or for reporting a violation of public policy; 2) the discharge was not for good cause and the employee had completed the employer’s probationary period of employment; 3) the employer violated the express provisions of its own written personnel policy; or 4) the employer terminated the employee solely based on the employee’s legal expression of free speech, including but not limited to statements made on social media. Mont. Code Ann. §39-2-904(a)-(d) (2023). The act defines “good cause” as “reasonable job-related grounds for dismissal based on a failure to satisfactorily perform job duties, disruption of the employer’s operation, or other legitimate business reason.” See Mont. Code Ann. §39-2-903(5) (2023). A legitimate business reason is one that is “neither false, whimsical, arbitrary or capricious, and it must have some logical relationship to the needs of the business.” Kestell v. Heritage Healthcare Care Corp., 858 P.2d 3, 7 (Mont. 1993). To defeat a motion for summary judgment on the issue of “good cause,” the employee may either prove that the given reason for the discharge is not “good cause” in and of itself, or that the given reason “is a pretext and not the honest reason for the discharge.” See Johnson v. Costco Wholesale, 152 P.3d 727, 733-734 (Mont. 2007).
[11] See Mont. Code Ann. §39-2-910 (2023); see also Mont. Code Ann. §39-2-904 (2023).
[12] Arbitrator Harry Platt has expounded on the use of the reasonableness standard, in approaching termination cases, under the just cause standard: “It is ordinarily the function of an arbitrator in interpreting a contract provision which requires ‘sufficient cause’ as a condition precedent to discharge not only to determine whether the employee involved is guilty of wrongdoing and if so, to confirm the employer’s right to discipline where its exercise is essential to the objective of efficiency, but also to safeguard the interests of the discharged employee by making reasonably sure that the causes for discharge were just and equitable and such as would appear to reasonable and fair minded persons as warranting discharge. To be sure, no standards exist to aid an arbitrator in finding a conclusive answer to such a question and, therefore, perhaps all he can do is to decide what reasonable man, mindful of the habits and customs of industrial life and the standards of justice and fair dealing prevalent in the community, ought to have done in similar circumstances and in that light to decide whether the conduct of the discharged employee and the disciplinary penalty are just.” Riley Stoker Corp., 7 LA 764 (Platt 1947); See also Richard Mittenthal & M. David Vaughn, Just Cause: An Evolving Concept, Arbitration 2006 Taking Stock in a New Century 32, 33 (2006).
[13] Connecticut is generally an “at-will” state. Unless protected by statute, contract, implied contract, discrimination, or public policy grounds, an employer can terminate an employee at will. See Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 474 (1980).
[14] Although “just cause” is a familiar term in employment law, familiarity does not necessarily facilitate the statement of a coherent definition. See Robert Abrams & Denis Nolan, Toward a Theory of Just Cause in Employee Discipline Cases, 1985 Duke L. J. 594 (1985). The statement, “no employee shall be disciplined or discharged except for just cause,” eludes a managerial definition. See Enterprise Wire Co., 46 LA 359 (Daugherty, 1966). Just cause substantially limits managerial discretion and in Connecticut, the courts have held that it simply means that employers are precluded from acting arbitrarily, or capriciously; in other words, an employer who wants to terminate an employee for just cause must do nothing more rigorous than substantiate a proper reason for dismissal. See Gaudio v. Griffin Health Services Corp., 249 Conn. 523, 539 (1999).
[15] Under Conn. Gen. Stat. §7-276 (2023), the Police Department Commission has general powers to make needed regulations for the governing of the police department according to law; and it shall also have the power and authority to proscribe suitable penalties for any officer or member of such department, including the suspension or removal from office. Similar just cause statutory provisions exist under Connecticut law for a fire department head under Conn. Gen. Stat. §7-302 (2023), and a municipal building official administering the building code under Conn. Gen. Stat. §29-260(c) (2023).
[16] The law provides the full range of procedural protections, including a written statement of the reasons relied upon by the employer to establish “good cause” for the dismissal.
[17] See N.Y.C. Admin. Code Law §§20-1271, et seq.
[18] Id.
[19] The statute applies to both unionized and non-unionized workers.
[20] N.Y.C. Admin. Code §20-1272(a).
[21] Id. at §20-1271.
[22] Id.
[23] Id.
[24] Id. at §§20-1272(b), (c).
[25] Id. at §20-1272 (d).
[26] Id. at §§20-1272 (a), 20-1271.
[27] Id. at §§1272 (g), 20-1271.
[28] Id. at §20-1207.
[29] Id. at §20-1211.
[30] Id. at §20-1273 (a).
[31] Id. at §20-1272 (i).
[32] Id. at §20-1273 (a).
[33] Id. at §20-1273 (j).
[34] See Restaurant Law Center, 90 F.4th at 106.
[35] Id. at 109.
[36] Id.
[37] Additionally, the district court rejected plaintiffs’ claims that the law’s arbitration provision is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act on the grounds that the provision does not prohibit the enforcement of private arbitration agreements. See Restaurant Law Center, 90 F.4th at 109; see also Motion Picture Projectionists v. RKO Century Warner Theatres, Inc., 1998 WL 477966 at *7 (S.D.N.Y Aug. 14, 1998) (rejecting plaintiff’s preemption argument, since CPLR §7503 (c) is not in conflict with, but rather supports national labor policy favoring the expeditious resolution of labor disputes).
[38] See Restaurant Law Center, 90 F.4th at 110-122.
[39] Id. See 29 U.S.C. §151.
[40] Id.
[41] See Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
[42] The Second Circuit opined that its jurisprudence has never applied Machinists to invalidate a law regulating the substance rather than the process of labor negotiations. Roundout Elec., Inc., 335 F.3d at 168-169; see Concerned Home Care Providers v. Cuomo, 783 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2015). In Concerned Home Care Providers, the court upheld New York’s Wage Parity Law as a minimum labor standard “may affect the package of benefits over which employers and employees can negotiate,” but it did not “limit the rights of self-organization or collective bargaining protected by the NLRA….” Id. at 86.
[43] Restaurant Law Center, 90 F.4th at 111.
[44] Id.
[45] Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 753 (1985).
[46] Id. at 754.
[47] Id. at 725.
[48] Id.; Restaurant Law Center, 90 F.4th at 110-113. See also Roundout Elec., Inc. v. NYS Dept. of Labor, 335 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2003). The Second Circuit has warned, “Machinists preemption is not a license for courts to close political routes to workplace protections simply because those protections may also be the subject of collective bargaining.” Restaurant Law Center, 90 F.4th at 114; see also Concerned Home Care Providers, 783 F.3d at 87.
[49] Restaurant Law Center, 90 F.4th at 118. The Restaurant Law Center court noted that the New York Wrongful Discharge Law, which applies to all fast-food restaurants, whether headquartered in New York or not, with at least 30 or more locations, whether in New York or not, plainly does not discriminate on interstate commerce on its face. Id. at 118-120. The court further noted that it could not be established that the Wrongful Discharge Law benefits in-state competitors at the expense of out-of-state competitors. Id. In short, the court found that the law does not impose direct costs on out-of-state franchisors or any out-of-state entity. Id.
[50] The law is a general welfare statute; and, hence, it passes muster under Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). In other words, where a statute regulates evenhandedly, to regulate a legitimate public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, a substantive challenge to the application of the statute will be rejected. Restaurant Law Center, 90 F.4th at 142.
Mark J. Berkowitz has been practicing labor and employment law as a solo practitioner in Ft. Lauderdale since 1995. He holds a bachelor’s degree in government from Hamilton College (1978), a J.D. from St. Louis University School of Law (1981), and a Master of Laws from the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School (1982). Since 2023, he has been an adjunct professor of law at St. Thomas University College of Law, teaching an elective class in alternative dispute resolution, which focuses on commercial and labor arbitration and mediation.
This column is submitted on behalf of the Labor and Employment Law Section, Yvette D. Everhart, chair, and Alicia Koepke, editor.
