Hexing the Vexing Litigant: Exploring Florida’s Expanded Vexatious Litigant Law

For eight enchanting seasons from 1964 to 1972, the whimsical sitcom Bewitched portrayed magical mischief with humor and charm.[1] The story followed the enchanting witch, Samantha, who falls in love with and marries the mortal, Darrin Stephens. Upon discovering that a mere twitch of her nose could cast a spell, delightful chaos unfolds as Darrin, his colleagues, and his friends become unsuspecting victims of the magical mischief. Much like the mischievous witches wreaking havoc in the television series, Florida courts, parties, and the judiciary have faced their share of chaos wrought by troublesome litigants. Since 2000, the Florida Legislature has attempted to hex the vexing litigant with F.S. §68.093 (2000) — Florida’s Vexatious Litigant Law. Though the prior statute has been utilized for the past 25 years, recent amendments to the statute have expanded the law’s application to more effectively mitigate parties’ vexatious conduct.
Former F.S. §68.093 (2000)
F.S. §68.093, enacted in 2000, was often frustrating in application. To seek relief against a vexing litigant, the prior version of the statute required the movant to establish that the litigant was previously found to be a vexatious litigant or if not, to meet numerous requirements. Reduced to six key requirements, the movant was required to establish that the litigant had 1) commenced, prosecuted, or maintained at least five civil actions; 2) in the last five years; 3) in the state of Florida; 4) all of which were governed by the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure or the Florida Probate Rules; 5) all cases were filed by the self-represented litigant; and 6) all five cases were finally and adversely determined against the litigant.[2]
The parameters of the prior version of the Vexatious Litigant Law were nearly impossible to satisfy because the laws’ application was limited to only specific types of cases in a narrow window of time. It also had a loophole: if a lawyer filed the action and then withdrew, that action would not meet the statute’s requirements.[3] These stringent parameters prevented practitioners and courts from using the statute to control disruptive conduct. See Chart 1 for a summary of the prior version of the Vexatious Litigant Law. The authors sincerely hope that the charts presented with this article will assist the busy practitioner in quickly evaluating the statute. Cut them out; keep them handy.
Amended F.S. §68.093 (2025)
Twenty-five years later, the Florida Legislature amended the Vexatious Litigant Law, thereby expanding the tools available to courts and parties to manage the vexing conduct of troublesome self-represented litigants. No nose-twitching required. These revisions to F.S. §68.093 (2025) became effective on July 1, 2025.
The legislature’s recent efforts follow the recommendations from a Florida Supreme Court workgroup appointed to study Florida’s Vexatious Litigant Law and the growing negative impact of vexatious litigation, despite the existing means to control it.[4] Chief Justice Charles T. Canady’s administrative order establishing the workgroup described vexatious and sham litigation as “legal proceedings that are unwarranted, frivolous, inherently false, without good cause, or filed solely to harass the opposing party; are burdensome and costly for the defendant; and abuse the judicial process and waste limited court resources.”[5] The results of the workgroup’s efforts were four recommendations to address vexatious and sham litigation in noncriminal court proceedings, including: 1) education for judges, court personnel, and attorneys;[6] 2) operational changes related to the Florida Courts E-Filing Portal; 3) potential rule amendments; and 4) potential statutory amendments.[7] The statutory amendments were championed in the 2025 legislative session as one of the critical means by which to make a meaningful shift in the negative impact of vexatious litigation.[8] The newly amended statute makes the following substantive changes:
1) Allows the court to include small claims and family law cases, along with civil and adversary probate proceedings, as well as cases in another state court or federal court governed by similar rules to Florida’s civil, probate, family, and small claims rules;
2) clarifies that the vexatious litigant designation can attach to any party, not just plaintiffs or petitioners;
3) includes in Florida’s definition of a vexatious litigant any party previously found to be a vexatious litigant in another state or federal court;
4) expands the timeframe from five years to seven years during which the five qualifying cases can be identified;
5) repeals the qualifier that if a case was filed by an attorney, even if that attorney later withdraws and the party proceeds pro se, that case cannot qualify as one of the five cases;
6) permits the court to consider conduct in one single case as qualifying for the vexatious designation through certain behaviors such as repeatedly relitigating a matter already determined, repeatedly filing papers previously subject to court ruling, or repeatedly filing unmeritorious papers or engaging in frivolous tactics for the purpose of delay;
7) clarifies the available sanctions based on which party is deemed the vexatious litigant;
8) removes the requirement for a vexatious litigant to obtain leave of an administrative judge to file future papers, requiring approval from the court generally instead; and
9) clarifies when the automatic stay expires.[9]
To conjure the magic effectively, one must truly grasp the spell book’s secrets. Let’s delve into the updated statute.
The newly fortified Vexatious Litigant Law broadens both the criteria for labeling someone as a “vexatious litigant” and the methods available to manage their disruptive behavior. In simple terms, it is easier than before to classify a litigant as vexatious under the revised statute, and both courts and parties have more tools at their disposal for mitigating vexatious conduct.
Qualifying as a Vexatious Litigant
See Chart 2 for a comparison of the requirements to qualify as a vexatious litigant under the 2000 and 2025 versions of the statute.
• Previously Found To Be a Vexatious Litigant — The criteria for being labeled a vexatious litigant have expanded, now offering five ways for a court to make this determination, compared to just two previously.[10] Expanded from its predecessor to capture a wider population of vexing litigants, a “vexatious litigant” is now classified as a self-represented person who has been previously found to be a vexatious litigant under this statute or, as recently added, by another state or federal court.[11] The statute clarifies that the self-represented person can be any party, not just a plaintiff or petitioner as the prior version limited.[12]
As a practical matter, practitioners on the opposite end of a vexing litigant should first check the registry of vexatious litigants maintained by the clerk of the Florida Supreme Court, which is available on the supreme court’s website.[13] Finding a litigant’s name on the vexatious litigant registry makes short work of the first step in hexing their vexing conduct. The recent expansion of the definition of a vexatious litigant to include those recognized as vexatious by other state or federal courts is particularly useful when a litigant has shown problematic behavior elsewhere. While other courts’ information might be harder to obtain than Florida’s registry, a simple internet search can often yield helpful results. If a problematic litigant was previously found to be a vexatious litigant, the threshold definition of a vexatious litigant is met.
• Sufficient Cases Within Allotted Timeframe — If a litigant does not meet the threshold definition of a vexatious litigant, §68.093 further defines a “vexatious litigant” as a self-represented person who, in the immediately preceding seven-year period, has commenced, prosecuted, or maintained at least five actions in any court that have been finally and adversely determined against the person.[14] There are several significant changes to this portion of the statute that further expand when a litigant can be deemed vexatious. Notably, the legislature expanded the look-back period for identifying qualifying cases from five years to seven years.[15] This change recognizes the amount of time it can take for cases to reach final resolution, tying into the existing requirement that cases be “finally and adversely determined against the person” to qualify. As before, the statute provides that an action is not finally and adversely determined if an appeal is pending.[16]
The previous version of the statute only considered civil and some probate cases as qualifying cases. The revised statute defines an “action” more broadly to include any case governed by the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure, the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 5.025 of the Florida Probate Rules, or the Florida Small Claims Rules.[17] This change recognizes that vexatious litigants appear in various noncriminal court divisions, requiring stronger measures to address disruptive behavior beyond the civil realm. Additionally, actions from other state or federal courts governed by similar procedural rules that meet the statute’s requirements now qualify.[18] This allows a court to look at a party’s litigation conduct holistically, preventing a litigant from dodging consequences by bouncing from court to court or state to state. This is significant given that the previous version of the statute was so narrowly constrained to only certain courts in the state of Florida.
As an added exemption, a case found to have been brought in good faith does not count toward the required five.[19] Unfortunately for practitioners, the good faith standard is not carved in stone. If good faith is raised by a vexing litigant, courts might take into consideration the litigant’s “honest belief or purpose, faithful performance of duties, observance of fair dealing standards, or an absence of fraudulent intent.”[20] When determining whether good faith to file an action exists, courts may consider a party’s litigation history, whether the party has submitted previous meritless filings, and whether those filings have hindered the court’s ability to fairly allocate its limited resources.[21] Good faith may be found where a reasonable inquiry supports the filing and reasonably clear legal justification for the filing exists.[22] Caselaw illustrates the nuanced approach courts take in determining good faith, focusing on the presence of a legitimate legal basis, reasonable inquiry, and the absence of an improper purpose.[23] The exemption of cases filed in good faith may invite argument from the litigant about the validity of otherwise qualifying cases. Presumably, the court must entertain such argument when deciding whether a litigant has sufficient qualifying cases under the vexatious litigant statute.
Another noteworthy adjustment to consider when identifying five qualifying cases is that the following clause in the prior version of the statute was eliminated from the revised statute:
If an action has been commenced on behalf of a party by an attorney licensed to practice law in this state, that action is not deemed to be pro se even if the attorney later withdraws from the representation and the party does not retain new counsel.[24]
By removing this clause, the statute now addresses litigants who initially had a legitimate cause of action that an attorney might support but who later engage in vexing conduct after proceeding pro se. This change allows the statute to target litigants who previously hid behind a lawyer’s initial good faith signature. Yet, the addition of an exemption for cases brought in good faith acts as a relief valve for situations in which the action was supported by facts or law, even if the litigant was not ultimately successful.
• Repeated Relitigation — The three new ways to deem a party vexatious provide powerful incantations for addressing conduct that previously went largely unchecked. The third way in which a person may be designated “vexatious” is if
After an action has been finally and adversely determined against the person, [they] repeatedly relitigate[] or attempt[] to relitigate either the validity of the determination against the same party as to whom the action was finally determined or the cause of action, claim, controversy, or any of the issues of fact or law determined by the final and adverse determination against the same party as to whom the action was finally determined.[25]
• Unmeritorious Filings or Frivolous Conduct — In that same vein, the revamped statute provides two additional new ways in which a litigant can qualify as vexatious. A person can be deemed a “vexatious litigant” if they “[r]epeatedly file[] pleadings, requests for relief, or other documents that have been the subject of previous rulings by the court in the same action,” or if they “[r]epeatedly file[] unmeritorious pleadings, requests for relief, or other documents; conduct[] unnecessary discovery; or engage[] in other tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay in any action.”[26]
The first of these changes strengthens the finality of court decisions, giving more substance to the concept rather than merely striking down repetitive improper attempts. The second addition formalizes what was previously under the court’s inherent authority, as shown through caselaw, to manage frivolous or excessive filings that disrupt the timely administration of justice.[27] Under the prior version of the statute, there was a clear line between what qualified as vexatious conduct and what qualified as frivolous conduct. The latter was addressable under caselaw and the court’s inherent authority; the former was addressable through the statute. That clear line has become a bit blurred now, which benefits the spellcaster.
Explicitly incorporating frivolous conduct into the ways in which a litigant may be deemed vexatious achieves the workgroup’s recommendation of improving the statute to address a wider population of vexing litigants. This change recognizes that some conduct — such as repeatedly filing unmeritorious papers — even in the context of one action, is so disruptive to the administration of justice that it cannot go unaddressed, and parties and courts must have more tools at their disposal to address it.[28] A party using this part of the new statute might consider referencing long-standing caselaw that grants the court inherent authority to manage such litigant conduct. Doing so may bring factual context from caselaw to the new statute.
This may be important in the initial application of the new statutory language as it will allow parties and courts to answer questions like: “How many unmeritorious pleadings are sufficient to constitute ‘repeatedly’ filing?” Or, “How frustrating and time-consuming must the litigant or papers be?” Identifying five qualifying cases within seven years is an objective, standard metric. But the three expanded ways to designate a litigant as vexatious are more subjective. Continued reliance on caselaw speaking to the court’s inherent authority will provide a strong factual backdrop for applying the new statutory language to litigant conduct.
The legislature has expanded the methods to label a litigant as vexatious, creating a stronger tool against troublesome litigants. Yet, the true magic in the statute is not found merely in the vexatious designation, but rather in the relief a party can seek thereafter. Chart 3 provides a useful visual for busy practitioners to determine whether a litigant meets any of the requirements for qualifying as a vexatious litigant under the new statute.
Mitigating the Impact of Vexatious Litigants
The legislature not only broadened the definition of a vexatious litigant, but also clarified and expanded the sanctions available to mitigate the impact of vexatious litigation. As noted in this article, the recent statutory changes make clear that any party can be deemed vexatious and any party can seek relief under the statute.[29] These provisions are not self-executing. A party must affirmatively seek the relief provided for in the statute. As the previous version of the statute provided, the revised statute provides two main sanctions: the posting of security and the issuance of a prefiling order preventing the vexatious litigant from filing future actions.
• Security and Stays — The statutory definition of “security” remains substantively unchanged with the only adjustments reflecting that any party, not just defendants, can seek security.[30] Imposing security — enough money to cover a party’s anticipated, reasonable litigation expenses — forces a litigant to “put their money where their mouth is.” To achieve this, any party may request the court to order the opposing party to provide security.[31] The requesting party must show two things: 1) that the opposing party is a vexatious litigant; and 2) that the vexatious litigant is not reasonably likely to prevail on the merits of the action pending against the moving party.[32] The statute requires notice and an evidentiary hearing on such motions.[33] At the hearing on the motion to furnish security, the court must consider evidence relevant to the motion.[34] If the court finds that the litigant meets the statutory definition of a vexatious litigant and is not reasonably likely to prevail in the pending action, then the court must order the vexatious litigant to post security in an amount and within a time the court finds appropriate.[35] If security is posted, the case proceeds. If security is not posted, the next steps depend on the vexatious litigant’s connection to the case, as clarified by the legislature in the recent amendments.[36]
If the required security is not posted and the vexatious litigant is the plaintiff or petitioner, then the court must immediately dismiss the action with prejudice only as to the party for whom security was required.[37] The nuances of this language become important in a multi-defendant case in which not all defendants seek security. For example, if Defendant A filed a motion for security against the vexatious plaintiff and the vexatious plaintiff failed to post the required security for the benefit of Defendant A, then the court must dismiss the action with prejudice as to Defendant A. The language of the statute implies that Defendants B, C, and D, for whom security was not requested or awarded, would remain in the action. Practically, this highlights the importance of all defendants joining together to seek security. Newly added to the statute, if the vexatious litigant who fails to post security is the defendant or respondent, then the court must impose one of three sanctions.[38] The court can: 1) deny the vexatious litigant’s requested relief; 2) strike their pleading or papers; or 3) enter a judgment of default against the litigant.[39]
Another valuable ingredient in the statutory potion is an automatic stay of a pending action pre-trial.[40] When a motion to furnish security is filed before trial, the action is automatically stayed, making it unnecessary for the moving party to plead or respond to the vexatious litigant’s papers. The stay remains in place until the court does one of three things outlined in a newly added provision of the statute. Option 1: The stay remains in place until the court rules on the motion for security.[41] If the motion for security is denied, the moving party has 10 days to respond to the operative pleading or request for relief.[42] If the motion for security is granted, then the moving party must respond or plead within 10 days after the security is provided.[43] Option 2: If a prefiling order has been entered, the stay remains until a ruling on the vexatious litigant’s motion for leave to file a new action.[44] The stay remains in place until the court dismisses a new action that was inadvertently accepted by the clerk after entry of a prefiling order.[45] Option 3: Finally, a stay can be vacated by the court, in its discretion.[46] The expansion and clarification of the stay provision maintains the status quo during critical junctures in the vexatious litigant evaluation.
• Prefiling Order — The court still retains the ability, upon a party’s request or on its own motion, to issue a prefiling order in addition to other statutory relief. The prefiling order halts the problematic conduct by prohibiting the vexatious litigant from “commencing, pro se, any new action in the courts of that circuit without first obtaining leave of the court.”[47] The notable adjustment in this section is that the leave need not be granted specifically by the administrative judge, but rather by the court generally. The statute remains unchanged in that leave can only be granted upon “a showing that the proposed action is meritorious and is not being filed for the purpose of delay or harassment,” and the court may require security before allowing such a filing.
As has been required since the statute was created, when a prefiling order is entered against a vexatious litigant, the clerk of that court must provide a copy of the order to the clerk of the Florida Supreme Court, which maintains a list of all vexatious litigants.[48] Once a prefiling order is entered, the clerk in that circuit cannot accept a new action from that vexatious litigant unless the litigant obtained an order from the court allowing the new action, as described herein.[49] If the clerk inadvertently permits a new filing to be accepted, any party to the action can file a notice pointing out the prefiling order and the court must automatically dismiss the action with prejudice within 10 days unless the litigant files a motion for leave to file the new action. If that motion is granted and the vexatious litigant is permitted to maintain that newly filed action, the litigant must serve a copy of the order and then the pleadings or responses, as appropriate, must be filed within 10 days thereafter.[50] A litigant’s disregard for a prefiling order remains punishable by contempt.[51]
• Cumulative Relief — The relief provided in Florida’s Vexatious Litigant Law remains cumulative with any other relief available under rule or law.[52] Non-vexing litigants have a robust set of tools at their disposal to address frivolous litigation. These tools are distributed across caselaw, procedural rules, and statutory provisions, providing a comprehensive framework for relief. The recent amendments to §68.093 (2025) have streamlined these options, enhancing the ability of litigants to seek redress efficiently. While the vexatious litigant statute is designed to prevent vexing conduct by restricting future filings and requiring security, it does not provide for monetary compensation to the affected party. The statute focuses on deterrence rather than restitution.
A key aspect of this framework is the ability of non-vexing litigants to file a motion for sanctions under the court’s inherent authority while simultaneously seeking a determination that a self-represented party is a vexatious litigant under the statute. Courts can use their inherent authority to impose attorneys’ fees for bad faith conduct,[53] prohibit further pro se filings,[54] remove indigency status,[55] and strike redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matters.[56] Sham pleadings can also be stricken.[57]
Statutes also support relief from vexing conduct in specific case types, for example, under the False Claims Act, in whistle-blower cases, and in cases filed under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act.[58] These statutes provide additional grounds for seeking sanctions for and relief from improper litigation conduct, further empowering litigants to address problematic behavior effectively.[59] There is also a specific statute aimed at mitigating the abusive litigation tactics of indigent prisoners.[60]
The legislature also passed Senate Bill 1652 in the 2025 regular session.[61] The bill created a public records exemption in non-criminal cases for immaterial, impertinent, or sham matters in pleadings or other documents.[62] Effective July 1, 2025, the exemption makes confidential and exempt from public disclosure under Ch. 119 “[a]ny matter in a pleading, in a request for relief, or in any other document which has been stricken by the court” where the court finds that the matter “[i]s immaterial, impertinent, or sham; and [w]ould defame or cause unwarranted damage to the good name or reputation of an individual or jeopardize the safety of an individual.”[63] A clear legislative intent was stated.
The [l]egislature finds that such stricken matters, if they remain in the public record, cause unwarranted and ongoing harm to affected persons and serve no identifiable public purpose. The [l]egislature further finds that the harm that may result from the release of such stricken matters outweighs any public benefit that may be derived from the disclosure of the stricken matter.[64]
Utilizing this provision may be necessary when dealing with a vexatious litigant who has filed harmful material within their unmeritorious and frivolous filings. This is another example of cumulative relief that parties should consider requesting to further mitigate the negative impact of vexatious conduct. These tools complement the vexatious litigant statute by providing additional means for redress under the cumulative relief umbrella within the statute, ensuring that vexatious conduct is curtailed while aggrieved parties can obtain redress for vexing conduct. These measures are crucial in maintaining the integrity of the judicial process and deterring abusive litigation practices.[65]
The amendments to §68.093 (2025) have expanded the criteria for qualifying as a vexatious litigant, allowing for broader application of the statute across various case types. By encompassing a wider range of parties, case types, and jurisdictions, the statute ensures that vexatious litigants can be identified and sanctioned more comprehensively, thereby protecting the judicial system from abuse. By leveraging both the vexatious litigant statute and the court’s inherent authority, Florida courts can effectively manage and mitigate vexatious litigation while also providing necessary compensation to those affected by such conduct. Chart 4 provides a comprehensive display of the criteria for declaring litigants as vexatious and imposing sanctions under the 2025 amendments to §68.093.
Conclusion
Dealing with vexatious litigants is far from the humor of the witches and warlocks in the sitcom, Bewitched. They disrupt the court system, hindering the timely administration of justice without legitimate purpose. Opposing parties, judges, and court personnel bear the brunt of this behavior, affecting other litigants whose court proceedings are unfairly delayed. Since 2000, Florida has sought to mitigate the impact of vexatious litigants. Now, with the passage of the recent amendments, Florida’s Vexatious Litigant Law has expanded the statute’s applicability and strengthened sanctions, providing parties and courts with more effective tools to address vexatious conduct. Vexing litigant be hexed.
[1] IMDb, Bewitched (June 6, 2025), https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0057733/.
[2] Fla. Stat. §68.093 (2000).
[3] Fla. Stat. §68.093(2)(d)(2) (2000).
[4] Workgroup on Vexatious Litigants, Final Report and Recommendations (Sept. 6, 2024) (recognizing existing means to address improper litigation and recommending education on such tools).
[5] Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC21-62 (Dec. 9, 2021).
[6] Notably, a webinar, “Florida’s Playbook on Vexatious Litigation: We’re Not Gonna Take It,” was developed to fulfill the education recommendation of the workgroup. See Workgroup on Vexatious Litigants, Final Report and Recommendations, p. 8 (Sept. 6, 2024).
[7] Workgroup on Vexatious Litigants, Final Report and Recommendations (Sept. 6, 2024).
[8] H.B. 1559, 2025 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2025) Final Bill Analysis (July 7, 2025).
[9] Fla. Stat. §68.093 (2000). H.B. 1559, 2025 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2025). For an in-depth review of the prior version of the statute, along with practical tools for practitioners looking to utilize the statute, see Lyndsey E. Siara & Andrea K. Holder, The Pitfalls and Prospects of Managing the Vexing Litigant, The Trial Advocate, Vol. 39, No. 3 (2020).
[10] Fla. Stat. §68.093 (2000) (defining a “vexatious litigant” as a person previously found to be a vexatious litigant under this section or a person who met the requirement of five civil cases within five years).
[11] Fla. Stat. §68.093(2)(c)(5) (2025).
[12] Fla. Stat. §68.093(3)(a)-(c) (2025).
[13] Fla. Stat. §68.093(6) (2025). The vexatious litigants list is linked on the Clerk’s Office landing page on the Florida Supreme Court’s website. According to the Workgroup on Vexatious Litigants’ Final Report and Recommendations, as of May 29, 2022, the Vexatious Litigant List had 92 total entries for 78 individuals (some names appear multiple times). See Workgroup on Vexatious Litigants, Final Report and Recommendations, p. 21 (Sept. 6, 2024). As of July 18, 2025, the list had a total of 260 entries for 124 individuals. See Office of the Clerk, Florida Supreme Court Vexatious Litigant List (July 18, 2025), https://supremecourt.f lcourts.gov/About-the-Court/Departments-of-the-Court/Clerk-s-Office.
[14] Fla. Stat. §68.093(2)(c)(1) (2025).
[15] Id.
[16] Fla. Stat. §68.093(2)(c)(5) (2025).
[17] Fla. Stat. §68.093(2)(a)(1) (2025).
[18] Fla. Stat. §68.093(2)(a)(2) (2025).
[19] Id.
[20] Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School, “Good Faith” (June 6, 2025), available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/good_faith#:~:text=Good%20faith%20is%20a%20broad,an%20absence%20of%20fraudulent%20intent%20.
[21] See Sibley v. Fla. Judicial Qualifications Comm’n, 973 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 2006).
[22] See Friends of Nassau Cnty, Inc. v. Nassau Cnty, 752 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (finding sanctions inappropriate where the attorneys acted in good faith when filing petition because they relied on expert opinions to support the grounds for the petition); see also Mercedes Lighting & Elec. Supply, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Gen. Servs., 560 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (finding that bid protest was not frivolous because it presented a justifiable question for resolution, supported by competent evidence).
[23] E.g., Sibley, 973 So. 2d 425; Friends of Nassau Cnty, Inc., 752 So. 2d 42; Mercedes Lighting & Elec. Supply, Inc., 560 So. 2d 272.
[24] Fla. Stat. §68.093(2)(d)(2) (2000).
[25] Fla. Stat. §68.093(2)(c)(2) (2025).
[26] Fla. Stat. §68.093(2)(c)(3)-(4) (2025).
[27] The court’s inherent authority is articulated in caselaw. See generally Spencer v. State, 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1999); Ardis v. Pensacola State Coll., 128 So. 3d 260 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); Ardis v. Ardis, 130 So. 3d 791 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); Graham v. Graham, 898 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Sibley, 973 So. 2d at 426 (“This [c]ourt and the United States Supreme Court have, when deemed necessary, exercised the inherent judicial authority to sanction an abusive litigant.”).
[28] See generally Werdell v. State, 16 So. 3d 875 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (finding that defendant’s frequent frivolous and repetitious pro se postconviction filings created a burden warranting barring further pro se filings); Bolton v. SE Prop. Holdings, LLC, 127 So. 3d 746 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (discussing requiring counsel as a sanction for frivolous conduct by pro se litigants); see also Martin v. State, 747 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 2000) (removing the indigency status of a litigant engaging in frivolous filings).
[29] Fla. Stat. §68.093(2)(b), (3)(a)-(b) (2025).
[30] Fla. Stat. §68.093(2)(b) (2025).
[31] Fla. Stat. §68.093(3)(a) (2025).
[32] Id.
[33] Id.
[34] Fla. Stat. §68.093(3)(b) (2025).
[35] Id.
[36] Fla. Stat. §68.093(3)(c) (2025).
[37] Fla. Stat. §68.093(3)(c)(1) (2025).
[38] Fla. Stat. §68.093(3)(c)(2) (2025).
[39] Id.
[40] Fla. Stat. §68.093(3)(d) (2025).
[41] Fla. Stat. §68.093(7)(b) (2025).
[42] Id.
[43] Id.
[44] Fla. Stat. §68.093(7)(c) (2025).
[45] Id.
[46] Fla. Stat. §68.093(7)(a) (2025).
[47] Fla. Stat. §68.093(4) (2025).
[48] Fla. Stat. §68.093(6) (2025).
[49] Fla. Stat. §68.093(5) (2025).
[50] Id.
[51] Fla. Stat. §68.093(4) (2025).
[52] Fla. Stat. §68.093(8) (2025).
[53] Moakley v. Smallwood, 826 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 2002).
[54] Ardis v. Pensacola State Coll., 128 So. 3d 260 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); see also Ardis v. Ardis, 130 So. 3d 791 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); Graham v. Graham, 898 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).
[55] See Martin v. State, 747 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 2000).
[56] See generally Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(f); Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.140(f).
[57] See generally Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.150; Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.150.
[58] Fla. Stat. §68.086(2) (2013); Fla. Stat. §112.3187(9) (2023); Fla. Stat. §501.211(3) (2001).
[59] Fla. Stat. §57.105 (2019).
[60] Fla. Stat. §57.085(6) (2004).
[61] S.B. 1652, 2025 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2025).
[62] Id.
[63] Id.
[64] Id.
[65] See Sibley, 973 So. 2d at 426 (noting also that “[o]ne justification for such a sanction lies in the protection of the rights of others to timely review of their legitimate filings”).





Lyndsey E. Siara
Andrea K. Holder 
