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Major Criminal Decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court 1997 Term

Criminal Law

During its 1997-1998 term the U. S. Supreme Court heard oral argument and handed down written decisions in 91 cases. The Court issued 38 opinions involving criminal law-related issues. This article summarizes the most significant criminal law-related decisions of the 1997-1998 term. The cases are arranged alphabetically by subject, and the case history, rationale of the Court, and the vote totals are included. Also included is a list of other criminal law-related cases from the 1997-1998 term.

Death Penalty

Buchanan v. Angelone, 66 U.S.L.W. 4075 (1998). Buchanan was convicted of capital murder for the killing of four family members in Virginia. During his sentencing hearing, his attorney introduced four mitigating factors to support a sentence of life in prison rather than the death penalty. These included Buchanan’s age, diminished mental capacity, and lack of a prior criminal record. The attorney asked the trial judge to instruct the jury that it “must consider the circumstances surrounding the offense, Buchanan’s history and background, and any other facts in mitigation of the offense.” The trial judge refused and instead instructed the jury to consider “all of the evidence” in pronouncing sentence. The jury sentenced Buchanan to death. After failing on direct appeal, Buchanan filed a habeas corpus petition seeking a new sentencing hearing in which the jury was to be expressly instructed that it must consider all of the mitigating evidence. Both the district court and the Fourth Circuit denied the petition.

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts, stating that the jury instructions in Buchanan’s case were sufficient and did not prevent the jury from considering all of the mitigating evidence. All that is required is that the defendant be allowed to present any mitigating evidence (which Buchanan was) and that the jury be allowed to hear it and consider it (which the jury was). The Court thought it “unlikely” that the jury would not consider the mitigating evidence after hearing two full days of testimony on it and being instructed to consider “all of the evidence.” 6-3 decision.

Hopkins v. Reeves, 66 U.S.L.W. 4449 (1998). Reeves was convicted on two counts of felony murder by a Nebraska jury and sentenced to death by a three-judge panel. He filed a federal habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction and death sentence. He asserted that the jury should have been instructed that it could find him guilty of either of two lesser included offenses (second degree murder or manslaughter). Nebraska law does not recognize lesser included offenses when the charged offense is felony murder; however, Reeves argued that Supreme Court precedent requires such instructions. The Eighth Circuit determined that Supreme Court precedent controlled and that the Constitution required an instruction on lesser included offenses.

The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Thomas, reversed the Nebraska decision. According to the Court, prior cases simply stand for the proposition that the state cannot treat capital and noncapital murder defendants differently with respect to jury instructions on lesser included offenses when state law recognizes the existence of such offenses. Since Nebraska does not recognize lesser included offenses for felony murder, there is no requirement that the jury be instructed on them. 8-1 decision.

Double Jeopardy

Monge v. California, 66 U.S.L.W. 4628 (1998). Under California’s three strikes law, a convicted felon is subject to a doubling of sentence if he or she has a prior “serious” felony conviction. Monge was convicted of selling marijuana. During his sentencing hearing, the prosecutor argued that the sentence enhancement should apply, offering as evidence a prior conviction for assault. The prosecutor alleged that Monge used a stick to inflict great bodily harm during the assault, but did not introduce evidence to substantiate this allegation. The sentencing judge found the allegation to be true and, based on the prior convictions, enhanced the sentence for selling marijuana. On appeal the California Court of Appeals found that the state failed to prove that the prior felony involved assault with a deadly weapon or serious bodily injury, a requirement to classify the prior conviction as a “serious” felony. Moreover, the appeals court refused to allow the state to prove the allegation on remand, holding that to do so would violate the double jeopardy clause. The California Supreme Court reversed, holding the double jeopardy clause does not apply to noncapital sentencing proceedings.

Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion for the Court affirmed the California Supreme Court, holding that the double jeopardy clause does not apply to sentencing proceedings in noncapital offenses. She refused to extend a prior decision ( Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981)) which held the double jeopardy clause applied in capital sentencing proceedings, reasoning that the Bullington precedent was intended to apply only to the narrow class of capital cases, in which defendants are entitled to heightened due process protections. As the Court has said before, death is different. 5-4 decision.

Due Process

Campbell v. Louisiana, 66 U.S.L.W. 4258 (1998). Campbell, a white man, was indicted by an all-white grand jury on a second degree murder charge. He challenged his indictment on the ground that the procedure for selecting grand jury forepersons in Louisiana was racially biased. In Louisiana, the judge selects the foreperson from grand jury venire. Between 1976 and 1993 no black person served as a foreperson, despite the county being 20 percent black. Campbell was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. He appealed his conviction, but the trial court and the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected his claim, saying he lacked standing as a white man to complain of racial discrimination against black men.

Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, reversed, holding that white defendants have the requisite standing to raise legal challenges to the exclusion of blacks as grand jurors. In essence, whites have standing to assert the equal protection rights of blacks in the selection of grand jury forepersons because both white defendants and potential black grand jury members 1) have an interest in a criminal justice system unsullied by unconstitutional racial discrimination, and 2) share a common interest in eliminating racial discrimination from the criminal justice system. Racial discrimination in the selection of grand jurors casts doubt on the integrity of the entire judicial process. Justice Kennedy reiterated the important function the grand jury performs, acting as a check on the power of the prosecutor. In dissent, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, said: “I fail to understand how the rights of blacks excluded from jury service can be vindicated by letting a white murderer go free” and questioned the notion that white defendants and black grand jury members have any shared interests. 7-2 decision.

Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 66 U.S.L.W. 4226 (1998). Woodard was sentenced to death for aggravated murder. Under Ohio state law, he had a right to a clemency hearing within 45 days of his scheduled execution. The Parole Authority, the body which handles clemency hearings, set a date for the hearing and notified Woodard. He asked the Parole Authority for permission to have his attorney present at the hearing and at any other clemency interviews he might be granted. The Parole Authority failed to respond to Woodard’s request. He filed suit in federal court alleging that Ohio’s clemency process violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as well as the due process clause. He was reluctant to speak in the clemency hearing for fear that what he said there might be used against him in any appeals he had pending. The district court found for the Parole Authority on both claims. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed on the due process claim but reversed on the self-incrimination claim.

The Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, affirmed the Fifth Circuit decision on the due process claim but reversed on the self-incrimination claim. On the due process claim, the Court noted that clemency is not a right protected by the due process clause, but is rather a “unilateral hope” or matter of grace, similar to a pardon or sentence commutation. The mere possibility of clemency does not amount to a “state created liberty interest” under Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981). On the self-incrimination claim, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege does not apply to proceedings which are voluntary. It applies only to compelled testimony. Since participation in a clemency hearing is voluntary, there is no privilege against self-incrimination. 9-0 decision.

Evidentiary Matters

Brogan v. United States, 66 U.S.L.W. 4111 (1998). Brogan was questioned by the Internal Revenue Service about his connection with a company that was under investigation for income tax violations. When agents of the IRS asked him whether he had ever taken cash or gifts from this company, he said simply, “No.” Brogan was subsequently convicted of knowingly and willfully making a false statement to a federal agency, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1001. On appeal to the Second Circuit he argued that the “exculpatory no” doctrine applied to his situation. Under this doctrine, the mere denial of wrongdoing is not a “false statement” within the meaning of the federal statute at issue. The Second Circuit upheld his conviction.

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the “exculpatory no” doctrine is not a part of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The doctrine merely permits a person to remain silent; it does not permit a person to lie. Allowing persons to deny wrongdoing without punishment would unnecessarily impede criminal investigations. Consequently, law enforcement officials may now prosecute defendants separately for misdeeds and for any false statements made by them during the investigation. 7-2 decision.

Gray v. Maryland, 66 U.S.L.W. 4202 (1998). Gray and another man (Bell) were tried jointly for murder. Bell confessed and implicated Gray in his confession. At trial the prosecution sought to introduce Bell’s confession into the record. The judge ordered the confession redacted, so the person reading the confession into evidence said “deleted” instead of Gray’s name. Immediately after the reading of the confession, the detective said he was able to arrest Gray after Bell confessed. The judge issued a limiting instruction that Bell’s confession could be used only against him. Both were convicted. Gray appealed, arguing the redaction was insufficient to protect his right under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), which holds that the introduction of a confession at a joint trial violates the nonconfessing defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine witnesses. The Maryland court of appeals set aside the conviction, but the state supreme court reinstated it, relying on another Supreme Court decision, Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200
(1987), that permits the use of redacted confessions when all references to the nonconfessing codefendant are removed.

The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Breyer, reversed the Maryland Supreme Court, and held that the redaction here was insufficient. When a confession is redacted by removing only the name of the nonconfessing defendant, but not all reference to the existence of the nonconfessing defendant, the redaction is insufficient to limit the substantial risk that the jury will infer that the removed name is that of the nonconfessing defendant. Here Gray’s name was redacted, but it was clear from the context of the confession that there was another person involved in the crime, and since Gray was on trial with the person who had confessed, the jury was likely to assume the name removed from the confession was in fact Gray’s. 5-4 decision.

Salinas v. United States, 66 U.S.L.W. 4011 (1997). Salinas, a deputy sheriff in a county jail in Texas, was given expensive gifts in return for allowing a federal prisoner housed in the jail to enjoy contact visits with two women. The sheriff was paid cash for allowing the activity. The county jail was participating in a program where it housed federal prisoners in exchange for a per diem payment; it also received federal aid to improve the facilities. Salinas was convicted of bribery and violation of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). On appeal, Salinas argued that the bribery conviction required proof that the bribe had an effect on the use of federal funds, and that the RICO conviction required proof that he committed at least two acts defined by the statute (such as bribery). The Fifth Circuit upheld the conviction.

In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed Salinas’ convictions. Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy ruled that a conviction under the RICO statute is valid as long as there is proof the defendant intended to further or in some way facilitate a criminal enterprise. Salinas did so here by knowing about and allowing the contact visits and accepting bribes, in the form of gifts, for allowing the visits. The bribery conviction also stands because there is nothing in the bribery statute which requires proof that the bribe must be directly related to federal funds, or involve misuse of federal funds; it is sufficient that the bribery occurred at an institution which received federal funding. 9-0 decision.

Swidler and Berlin v. United States, 66 U.S.L.W. 4538 (1998). As part of the investigation of possible wrongdoing in the Clinton White House, the Office of the Independent Counsel subpoenaed material relating to the 1993 dismissal of employees of the White House Travel Office. Among the material sought were notes made by attorney James Hamilton at a meeting with then-Deputy White House Counsel Vincent Foster, who later committed suicide. Hamilton sought to have the subpoena quashed, asserting his notes were work product protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege. The district court refused to enforce the subpoena, but the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding the attorney-client privilege was not absolute and did not apply in this case because the client was now dead and the material was of “substantial importance” to a criminal investigation.

Acknowledging the national significance of the case and the necessity for a prompt resolution of the issue, the Supreme Court in a rare but not unprecedented move expedited the hearing of the case. The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, reversed the District of Columbia Circuit and held that Hamilton’s notes were protected by the attorney-client privilege. The Court noted that this privilege is one of the oldest privileges recognized by the law and that the Federal Rules of Evidence, while not expressly mentioning the privilege, requires courts to apply common law principles and precedent. While some have criticized allowing the privilege to continue beyond the death of the client, the Court felt that there were reasons to justify continuing the privilege even after the client’s death, including protection of the client’s reputation and protection of the estate from civil liability. 6-3 decision.

United States v. Scheffer, 66 U.S.L.W. 4235 (1998). Airman Scheffer was court-martialed for numerous offenses, including using drugs. Prior to trial he failed a drug test, but passed a lie detector test. To rebut prosecution attacks on his credibility at trial, he sought to introduce results of a favorable lie detector test concerning his denial of using drugs. The military judge refused, ruling that polygraph examinations do not have sufficient scientific acceptability to be relevant and that Military Rule of Evidence 707 specifically barred the introduction of polygraph evidence. He then testified at trial and denied using drugs. He was convicted on all charges. On appeal, Scheffer argued the evidence rule prohibiting polygraph evidence violated his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces reversed, holding that a per se ban on polygraph evidence violated Scheffer’s right to present a defense. The court cited Supreme Court precedent that a rule excluding all hypnotically refreshed testimony infringed on a criminal defendants right to testify on his own behalf.

The Supreme Court, through Justice Thomas, reversed the appeals court and held that a blanket ban on the introduction of polygraph evidence in criminal trials does not violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. Justice Thomas noted that a blanket rule excluding polygraph evidence was justified because of the lack of consensus that such evidence is reliable. The Sixth Amendment right to present a defense is not absolute and may be restricted as long as the restrictions are not arbitrary. While eight justices supported the decision, only four supported a blanket ban; four others suggested there might be instances in which the evidence would be admissible. The case came from the military courts, but nothing in the opinion limits the application of the rule to other courts. Most courts, however, bar the admission into evidence of polygraph test results. 8-1 decision.

Liability Under §1983

Crawford-El v. Britton, 66 U.S.L.W. 4311 (1998). Crawford-El, an inmate in the District of Columbia, filed a number of lawsuits against the prison system. He was one of a number of inmates who were transferred to prisons around the country when the district prison system became overcrowded. He was moved to six different prisons, finally ending up in Florida. His personal possessions did not reach him until several months after his arrival in Florida. He filed a lawsuit against Britton, an official of the district’s prison system, alleging she had intentionally diverted his possessions to punish him for filing so many lawsuits against the prison system. Britton denied acting improperly and asserted qualified immunity. She sought and obtained a summary judgment. The District of Columbia, sitting en banc, affirmed the summary judgment, holding that a plaintiff in a retaliatory motive case must establish, prior to discovery, the official’s motive by clear and convincing evidence.

The Supreme Court, Justice Stevens writing the majority opinion, vacated the judgment of the lower courts and reinstated the lawsuit. The Court stated that summary judgment is inappropriate when the law the official is alleged to have violated is clearly established at the time the official acted. Evidence of improper motive is irrelevant to a qualified immunity defense asserted in a motion for summary judgment. In such cases the plaintiff is entitled to pursue discovery for the purpose of establishing the official’s improper motive, hence Crawford-El may proceed with discovery. 5-4 decision.

Kalina v. Fletcher, 66 U.S.L.W. 4031 (1997). Kalina was a prosecuting attorney in Washington state who prepared several documents used to obtain an arrest warrant for Fletcher in connection with a burglary. In one of these documents, an affidavit used to establish probable cause, she made two inaccurate statements: 1) she said a witness had identified Fletcher from a photo array when in fact there had been no such identification; and 2) she asserted Fletcher was not authorized to be in the school when in fact he had done work for the school and was authorized to be there. Fletcher was arrested and spent one day in jail before the charges against him were dismissed. He then filed a §1983 action against Kalina, alleging she violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. She responded by asserting absolute immunity on the ground that she was acting as a prosecutor when she executed the inaccurate affidavit. The district court and the Ninth Circuit refused to grant Kalina absolute immunity, explaining it is available only for prosecutorial conduct, not for investigative conduct, and Kalina was acting as an investigator rather than a prosecutor when she executed the affidavit.

The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, agreed with the lower courts that absolute immunity did not apply when a prosecutor acts as an investigator rather than as a prosecutor. Historically, prosecutors are accorded absolute immunity, but only when operating solely in their capacity as prosecutors. If the lower courts find that Kalina is entitled to qualified immunity, she may be protected from suit in this case, unless the plaintiff can establish Kalina’s misstatements were intentional rather than negligent. 9-0 decision.

Sacramento County, California v. Lewis, 66 U.S.L.W. 4407 (1998). Philip Lewis was a passenger on a motorcycle involved in a high-speed chase with a police vehicle. The police officer had observed the motorcycle speeding and gave chase. The motorcycle crashed and Lewis was struck and killed by the police car. Lewis’ parents sued the officer, his department, and the county, alleging the high-speed chase violated Lewis’ substantive due process right to life. The district court ruled against the Lewises, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that law enforcement officials can be held liable for injuries which result from high-speed pursuits when the chase is conducted with either “deliberate indifference” to or “reckless disregard” for life.

In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit. The Court explained that the proper standard for determining when law enforcement conduct violates substantive due process is “conduct that shocks the conscience of the court,” and not “deliberate indifference.” The Court added that for liability to attach in high-speed chases by the police, “only a purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest will satisfy the shock the conscience test.” 9-0 decision.

Prison Regulations

Pennsylvania Department of Correction v. Yeskey, 66 U.S.L.W. 4481 (1998). Yeskey was sentenced to 18 to 36 months’ incarceration by a Pennsylvania court. The court recommended he be placed in a boot camp program which, if he completed it successfully, would result in early parole after just six months. Prison officials refused to place Yeskey in the boot camp facility because he had a medical history of hypertension. He then sued the Pennsylvania Department of Correction, arguing that the department’s refusal to place him in the boot camp violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The ADA prohibits public entities from discriminating against otherwise qualified individuals on the basis of the individual’s disability. Yeskey argued that the ADA applied to corrections as well as other public entities. The district court determined the ADA did not apply to prisons and dismissed the case. The Third Circuit reversed the district court and reinstated the lawsuit.

The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the decision of the Third Circuit, holding that the plain language of the ADA applies to prisons just as it does to any other public entity. 9-0 decision.

Search and Seizure Law

Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 66 U.S.L.W. 4524 (1998). In a case with significant implications for law enforcement and corrections personnel, the Court by a narrow margin held that the exclusionary rule does not apply in parole revocation hearings. Scott was on parole after serving 10 years in prison. Five months after his release, probation officers received information that Scott had weapons in his possession, which would constitute a violation of the terms of his parole. Probation officers searched Scott’s residence without probable cause or a warrant, and found several weapons. At his parole revocation hearing Scott sought to have the weapons excluded as the product of an unlawful search. The parole board and the district court refused, but the state court of appeals ordered the evidence excluded. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, ordered the weapons suppressed, on the ground that the exclusionary rule should apply in parole revocation hearings whenever probation officers conduct searches of known parolees without at least “reasonable suspicion” of criminal activity. Application of the exclusionary rule in these cases, the court felt, would deter probation officers from engaging in illegal searches.

The Supreme Court reversed the state court and held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to parole revocation hearings. The majority opinion by Justice Thomas stressed the Court’s traditional reluctance to extend the judicially created remedy to nontrial proceedings, and the limited deterrent value of the rule in such proceedings. The Court felt suppression would have only a minimal deterrent effect on parole officers, while having the effect of turning revocation hearings into mini-trials. Thomas also argued that applying the exclusionary rule to parole revocation hearings would unnecessarily hamper the state’s legitimate interest in ensuring parolees do not violate the terms of their parole. The dissent argued that the effect of the ruling was to leave probation officers with virtually unchecked power to interfere in the lives of parolees, absent any individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. Nothing in the decision limits it to parole revocation hearings, so it is likely that the Court would hold similarly regarding probation revocation hearings. This is a significant decision, as there are nearly three million people currently on probation or parole, all of whom potentially face revocation hearings. 5-4 decision.

United States v. Ramirez, 66 U.S.L.W. 4169 (1998). Law enforcement officers looking for a dangerous escaped prisoner named Shelby obtained a no-knock search warrant for Ramirez’s house. The Supreme Court has recently held that the Fourth Amendment requirement of reasonableness incorporates the common law requirement to “knock and announce” ( Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995)). The Court also has held that this general rule does not apply when police have “mere suspicion” that knocking and announcing will subject them to harm or could result in destruction of evidence ( Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997)). In executing the no-knock warrant here, the police broke a small window in Ramirez’s garage. Inside, they did not locate Shelby but did find several weapons. Ramirez was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of federal law. Ramirez moved to suppress the weapons, arguing that while no-knock warrants sometimes were permissible, in cases like this when there was property damage the police must have more proof of the existence of an exigent circumstance to justify an entry which results in property damage. The district court and the Ninth Circuit agreed and ordered the evidence suppressed.

The Supreme Court unanimously overturned the Ninth Circuit, and held that law enforcement officers do not need to possess more than reasonable suspicion to execute a no-knock warrant in which there is property damage. The Court determined that the police in this case reasonably believed Shelby was in the Ramirez home, and that minor property damage did not transform an otherwise lawful entry into an unlawful one. While the manner of execution is a factor in determining the validity of a search warrant, here there was only minor damage. The Court noted, however, that unnecessary, excessive property damage could make an otherwise lawful entry unlawful. 9-0 decision.


The Supreme Court’s 1997 term was marked by a number of significant decisions. Some of these decisions involved interpretations of federal statutes, in particular the federal firearms laws and the AEDPA. Also decided were cases involving procedural issues in habeas corpus proceedings. These are areas where the Court has spent considerable time during the past several terms, and which the Court likely will revisit in the future as new challenges to these laws arise. Of note is a decline in the number of decisions involving administration of the death penalty. Also worth noting is a dearth of decisions on corrections law and search and seizure law. The Court declined the opportunity to address the constitutionality of several currently “hot” issues in criminal justice, including sex offender registration and notification and anti-stalking laws. These, too, likely will come before the Court again in the near future.

In most cases, the Court continued to uphold law enforcement interests. There is little reason to suspect this trend is about to change. Several cases have already been accepted for consideration during the 1998-1999 term that present the Court with the opportunity to further expand the authority of law enforcement officers. These include Minnesota v. Carter (Is someone entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy as a guest in someone else’s home?); Knowles v. Iowa (May a state enact a statute giving police blanket authority to conduct a full search of a person upon issuance of a citation?); Wyoming v. Houghton (Does the automobile exception allow police to search the personal belongings of a passenger of a car when the driver is arrested?); and City of Chicago v. Morales (Is a loitering ordinance which authorizes police to arrest a person whom he reasonably believes is gang member and who refuses to disperse unconstitutionally vague or violative of substantive due process?). Decisions in these case may have a substantial impact on the administration of justice.

Other criminal law-related cases from the 1997-1998 term are:
Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 66 U.S.L.W. 4213 (1998).
Bates v. United States, 66 U.S.L.W. 4006 (1997).
Bousley v. United States, 66 U.S.L.W. 4346 (1998).
Breard v. Greene, 66 U.S.L.W. 3687 (April 14, 1998).
Bryan v. United States , 66 U.S.L.W. 4475 (1998).
Calderon v. Thompson, 66 U.S.L.W. 4301 (1998).
Calderon v. Ashmus, 66 U.S.L.W. 4382 (1998).
Caron v. United States , 66 U.S.L.W. 4511 (1998).
Edwards v. United States , 66 U.S.L.W. 4293 (1998).
General Electric v. Joiner, 66 U.S.L.W. 4036 (1998).
Hohn v. United States , 66 U.S.L.W. 4489 (1998).
Hudson v. United States, 66 U.S.L.W. 4024 (1997).
Lewis v. United States, 66 U.S.L.W. 4194 (1998).
Muscarello v. United States , 66 U.S.L.W. 4459 (1998).
New Mexico ex rel. Oritz v. Reed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3780 (1998).
Spencer v. Kemna , 66 U.S.L.W. 4152 (1998).
Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal , 66 U.S.L.W. 4352 (1998).
Trest v. Cain , 66 U.S.L.W. 4023 (1997).
United States v. Bajakajian, 66 U.S.L.W. 4514 (1998).
United States v. Balsys , 66 U.S.L.W. 4613 (1998).
United States v. Cabrales, 66 U.S.L.W. 4423 (1998).

Craig Hemmens is assistant professor of criminal justice administration at Boise State University in Boise, Idaho. He has a J.D. from North Carolina Central University School of Law and a Ph.D. in criminal justice from Sam Houston State University. He has published a number of articles in journals such as the American Journal of Criminal Law,
Federal Probation and The Journal of Criminal Justice.

Rolando V. del Carmen is professor of criminal justice in the College of Criminal Justice, Sam Houston State University, in Huntsville, Texas. He has several law degrees and has written several books and numerous articles on a variety of legal topics.

This column is submitted on behalf of the Criminal Law Section, Michael R. Band, chair, and Randy E. Merrill, editor.

Criminal Law