The Application of Kinney System, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co. to Modification of Child Custody Proceedings
As our society becomes increasingly mobile, parents are frequently faced with exercising timesharing with minor children across state lines. Courts are increasingly entering orders with respect to such interstate timesharing. Once one parent and a minor child have resided for more than six months in a foreign jurisdiction, in which jurisdiction should a modification be sought? Should it be the jurisdiction where the initial determination was made or the jurisdiction in which the child is residing?
In addition to the case law, both the federal and state legislatures have enacted statutes to attempt to create consistent rules to provide for increased clarity and consistency with respect to jurisdictional issues in child custody cases. Through the enactment of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (adopted in 1968), the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (adopted in 1997), and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (adopted by Florida October 1, 2002), the jurisdictional rules have been refined and made more consistent, while the basic concepts guiding whether a court should exercise jurisdiction over a case have been preserved.
One of the basic tenets of law with respect to a court exercising its subject matter jurisdiction is the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Courts have long recognized that, even if a forum may properly exercise jurisdiction over an action, that forum may not be the most convenient forum to hear the matter. Pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court located in an “inconvenient forum” may decline to exercise its jurisdiction.
In 1996, the Florida Supreme Court in the seminal case Kinney System, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1996), adopted the federal forum non conveniens doctrine.1 The four-prong test set forth in Kinney was then codified in Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.061, and will be referred to herein as the “ Kinney test.”2
A review of the case law reveals that when the issue of forum non conveniens is raised by a party in a modification of custody case, the Kinney test has rarely been recognized or applied. A reading of the UCCJEA, the commentary by the National Conference of Commissioners to the Uniform Act, and the case law that applies the Florida transfer of venue statute with respect to transfers of modification actions within the state of Florida, as well as the dicta in a few cases that mention the application of Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.061 in the context of custody modifications, lead to the conclusion that the Kinney test, as codified in Rule 1.061, should consistently be applied in modification cases in which one party seeks to have a Florida court decline to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of forum non conveniens.
Continuing Exclusive Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction over modifications of child custody determinations is established by both federal law and state law.3 On the federal level, the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) establishes whether a court may assume jurisdiction over a child custody determination.4 The term “custody determination” is defined broadly to include any “judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the custody of a child, and includes permanent and temporary orders, and initial orders and modifications.”5 With respect to the modification of an initial custody determination, the PKPA states that “[t]he jurisdiction of a court of a state which has made a child custody or visitation determination consistently with the provisions of this section continues as long as the requirement of subsection (c)(1) of this section continues to be met and such [s]tate remains the residence of the child or of any contestant.” f Subsection (c)(1) states that the court must have jurisdiction under the law of the state in which the court lies.7 Full faith and credit is to be given to child custody determinations made in any jurisdiction by every other jurisdiction.8 In fact, a court “shall not modify except as provided [in the PKPA] any custody determination or visitation determination made consistently with the provisions of this section by a court of another state.”9 Only if the court that made the custody determination either no longer has jurisdiction over the action or has declined to exercise that jurisdiction may a court of another state modify the custody determination.10
Promulgated in 1997, the UCCJEA replaced the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and resolved certain inconsistencies between the UCCJA and the PKPA. It also added a uniform procedure for registration and enforcement of child custody orders across state lines and sought to increase judicial communication and cooperation with respect to child custody cases.
The UCCJEA sets forth the jurisdiction of the Florida courts both with respect to initial actions and actions to modify existing determinations. Pursuant to §61.514,11 an initial action to determine child custody may be brought in the child’s “home state,” which generally is the jurisdiction in which the minor child has resided for the past six months. Section 61.515 provides that a court which makes an initial determination retains exclusive jurisdiction with respect to modification actions unless and until either 1) a Florida court determines that the child and both parents no longer “have a significant connection” to this state and substantial evidence concerning the child’s situation is no longer available in this state, or 2) a Florida court or a court of another state determines that none of the parents or the child continue to reside in the state of Florida.12
However, in contrast to the presumption that the court making an initial determination retains exclusive jurisdiction over child custody matters until such time as all of the relevant parties no longer have significant contacts with the state of Florida or no longer reside here, §61.516 and case law also contemplate that a Florida court may choose not to exercise jurisdiction over a case if another forum would be more convenient. The fact that the initial proceeding may have occurred in a non-U.S. court or that the alternate forum being sought is a non-U.S. forum, does not change the analysis.13 Thus the same analysis applies whether the alternate forum is in a sister state or in another country.
Declination to Exercise Jurisdiction
The UCCJEA recognizes that a court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction in a modification proceeding on the basis that another forum is more convenient. Section 61.516 delineates that a Florida court otherwise having jurisdiction over a child custody action may make the determination that another state “would be a more convenient forum under section 61.520” to hear the case.14
F.S. §61.520, “Inconvenient forum,” states in part in subsection (1):
A court of this state which has jurisdiction under this part to make a child custody determination may decline to exercise its jurisdiction at any time if it determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum.
Thus, the statute seems to require that a court determine both that it is an inconvenient forum and that the court of another state is a more appropriate forum.15
Subsection (2) of §61.520 sets forth several factors for a court to consider when making a determination as to “whether it is appropriate for a court of another state to exercise jurisdiction.”16 The parties are entitled to submit information concerning “all relevant factors, including” those enumerated in the statute.17 It is interesting to note that the factors set forth in §61.520 are those to determine whether another court would be a more appropriate forum. There is no mention of the factors to be applied to determine whether the current forum is an inconvenient forum. Furthermore, the language of the statute reflects that the factors enumerated are those to be included in the inquiry. Thus, the factors listed are not meant to be exclusive of others. The commentary by the National Conference of Commissioners to the Uniform Act intimates that other factors are intended to be considered, including whether the alternate forum would have personal jurisdiction over all of the parties.18 Florida case law also supports this position.
Florida cases that have considered a transfer of venue within the state specifically refer not only to the factors enumerated under §61.520(2), but also to Florida’s change of venue statute, §47.122.19 In Vitale v. Vitale, 994 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), and Gunter v. Jennings, 980 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008), a party sought a change of venue within the state of Florida. In reaching a decision, each court relied on Florida’s change of venue statute, §47.122,20 and not on the provisions of the UCCJEA.
On the other hand, Florida cases that have considered a transfer of a modification case to a sister state have not clearly enumerated the factors considered nor laid out the analysis in the manner typical in other types of cases involving the issue of forum non conveniens. Kinney and Rule 1.061 have rarely been evoked in these cases. However, if the Florida change of venue statute applies to cases in which a party seeks to have the action transferred to another jurisdiction within the state, it is logical that the Kinney test should be applied in cases in which a party seeks to have the action transferred to a sister state.21
The Kinney Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine
The Florida Supreme Court stated in Kinney System, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co.,22 “Forum non conveniens is a common law doctrine addressing the problem that arises when a local court technically has jurisdiction over a suit but the cause of action may be fairly and more conveniently litigated elsewhere.”23
The Kinney test has four prongs.24 The first prong of the test requires a court to consider whether the alternate forum may exercise personal jurisdiction over all of the parties. “An adequate alternative forum is established when the defendants are amenable to process in the other jurisdiction.”25 In addition, the court will attempt to determine whether the plaintiff would be able to bring the same claims in the other jurisdiction.26 The second prong of the Kinney tests looks at the private interests of the parties. “In balancing the private interests of the parties, the four concerns to be addressed are adequate access to evidence, adequate access to witnesses, adequate enforcement of judgments, and the practicalities and expenses associated with the litigation.”27 The third prong of the Kinney test considers the public interest of the forum state. If the balance of private interests is at or near equipoise, then a court should further determine whether the factors of the public interest tip the balance in favor of trial in the alternate forum. “The inquiry focuses on whether the nexus with the forum is sufficient to justify the forum’s commitment of judicial time and resources.”28 The fourth prong of the Kinney test looks to whether the plaintiff would be unduly prejudiced by having to bring the action in the alternate forum and whether the action could be commenced in the alternate forum without undue delay.29
It should be noted that if a contract contains a forum selection clause, the parties to that contract may be precluded from raising forum non conveniens.30 In the context of family law, marital settlement agreements and mediated agreements are contracts and are to be interpreted pursuant to the provisions of contract law.31 Thus, prior to inserting a forum selection clause into an agreement containing provisions related to child custody and timesharing, parties should consider case law concerning the enforcement of forum selection clauses.
While the application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens is a question of law for the court, it is dependent on findings of fact made by the trial court. The case law clearly states that a trial court should make specific findings of fact, so as to provide meaningful appellate review,32 with respect to any determination of whether the forum with continuing jurisdiction is an inconvenient forum and whether another forum is an adequate forum. The modification cases which have engaged in any inquiry as to whether a court is an inconvenient forum also state that it is necessary for a trial court to make specific findings of fact.33
Application of Kinney in Modification of Custody Cases
Although not consistently used, there is support for the application of the Kinney test in modification of child custody cases in family law case law.34
The first and fourth prongs of the Kinney test are to ascertain if an alternate forum exists where the action may properly be brought that will have personal jurisdiction over all of the parties. It cannot be assumed that a court having subject matter jurisdiction over a child custody matter will have personal jurisdiction over the parties to the action. A court having subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA may enter a child custody determination even if it lacks personal jurisdiction over one of the parties.35 Under Florida law, in order for a Florida court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a party, the party must either 1) be a legal resident of (domiciled in) the state of Florida, or 2) must be subject to service of process pursuant to Florida’s long arm statute and have the minimal contacts with the state required by the U.S. Constitution.36 For jurisdictional purposes, a court must look at both a party’s actual residence (residence) and legal residence (domicile).37 Residence and domicile are not synonymous in determining whether a court has personal jurisdiction over the parties in any case. Generally, “[t]he test of [legal] residency is physical presence in Florida and the concurrent intent to be a permanent resident.” al If a court lacks personal jurisdiction over a party, it may not adjudicate support and property rights related to that party, including an obligation for child support.39
Pursuant to the UCCJEA, appearing in an action for child custody will not cause a party to be subject to the personal jurisdiction of the courts of that state for any other purpose. Section 61.510 specifically permits a party to appear in an action brought pursuant to the UCCJEA without that party having to submit to the personal jurisdiction of that court for any other purpose or matter,40 including for the purpose of adjudicating that party’s obligation for child support.41 The commentary by the National Conference of Commissioners to the Uniform Act supports this conclusion.
According to the commentary by the National Conference of Commissioners to the Uniform Act, whether a court has personal jurisdiction over all of the parties is a factor to be considered when making a determination as to which forum is the more convenient one. The comment that follows the provision related to forum non conveniens:
In applying subsection (7) [subsection (g) of the Fla. Stat. §61.520(2)] on expeditious resolution of the controversy, the court could consider the different procedural and evidentiary laws of the two [s]tates, as well as the flexibility of the court dockets. It also should consider the ability of a court to arrive at a solution to all the legal issues surrounding the family. If one [s]tate has jurisdiction to decide both the custody and support issues, it would be desirable to determine that [s]tate to be the most convenient forum. The same is true when children of the same family live in different [s]tates. It would be inappropriate to require parents to have custody proceedings in several [s]tates when one [s]tate could resolve the custody of all the children.42
The commentary pays particular attention to the issue of whether a court is able to exercise personal jurisdiction over all of the parties to the action. If a court lacks personal jurisdiction over a party, it will be without jurisdiction to decide the support issues relevant to the case. Personal jurisdiction over all of the parties is not a factor listed in §61.520(2).
In Thomas v. Thomas, 724 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999),43 the Fourth District Court of Appeal considered, among other issues, a conflict in its precedents with respect to the application of the appellate rule applicable to hear an appeal of an order related to a dismissal of a child custody determination. The court discussed whether an order relating to whether a court should decline to exercise jurisdiction based on inconvenient forum was an order related to the transfer of venue or an outright dismissal on the grounds of forum non conveniens. The court reached an interesting conclusion with respect to the application of the forum non conveniens doctrine and its application to the UCCJA (the precursor to the UCCJEA). The court first distinguished between the criteria in the UCCJA for determining when a [s]tate is an inconvenient forum and forum non conveniens. The court then stated, “[t]he concept of forum non conveniens by its very nature encompasses both [Florida Statutes] section 47.122 and [Florida Rule of Civil Procedure] 1.061.” In reaching its conclusions, the court specifically cited the adoption of the federal forum non conveniens doctrine by the Florida Supreme Court in Kinney and the subsequent adoption of a specific rule on forum non conveniens in Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.061. The Fourth District Court of Appeal appears to accept that the Kinney test may be applied in cases where modification of custody is at issue. The Thomas court then determined that Florida was an inconvenient forum under the circumstances without ostensibly applying the test set forth in Kinney. In parsing the language used by the court, the Fourth District Court of Appeal seemed to state that a custody action could be transferred based either upon the factors enumerated in the UCCJA or on the basis of forum non conveniens.
In the same year as Thomas, the Third District decided Bacardi v. Lindzon, 728 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1999), a trust-related action dismissed by the trial court on the grounds of forum non conveniens. In its opinion, the district court of appeal cited Booker v. Booker, 636 So.2d 796 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), as an example of a case in which the trial court engaged in an analysis of the factors set forth in Kinney.44
In Booker,45 decided in 1994, and thus prior to Kinney, the First District Court of Appeal considered declining to exercise jurisdiction over the modification of a child custody order pursuant to the UCCJA. The court ultimately remanded the case due to the failure of the trial court to make the necessary findings of fact to support the dismissal of the petition on the basis of Florida being an inconvenient forum. The court stated,
The [S]upreme [C]ourt has held that section 61.1316 [of the UCCJA] simply “codifies and strengthens the longstanding judicial doctrine of inconvenient forum.” Yurgel, 572 So. 2d at 1329. However, the trial court’s discretion under this doctrine “is not unbridled. Its exercise should be based on the established guides for application of the doctrine, vis-a-vis the facts disclosed.” Southern Railway Company v. McCubbins, 196 So. 2d 512, 516-17 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967).
In its discussion, the court cited several cases in support of its decision. Of the four cases cited by the court, only one, Yurgel v. Yurgel, 572 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 1990), is a family law case; the other cases are non-family law forum non conveniens and transfer of venue cases. The UCCJA was not cited by the court. This language from Booker has been cited in subsequent case law.46
Subsequent to Florida’s adoption of the UCCJEA, the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Gonzalez v. Ayala, 936 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006), quoted Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.061 in its opinion and noted its application to a modification of custody case. Although the court cited Rule 1.061, the court also cited F.S. §47.122 and proceeded to arrive at a decision without specifically applying each prong of the Kinney test.
Conclusion
It does not appear that the application of the Kinney test has been utilized in child custody modification proceedings when the issue of Florida being an inconvenient forum has been raised. The Kinney test should be applied to such cases and would be a useful tool in assisting a court in determining whether a child custody modification action should be transferred to an alternate forum located in another state. First, it would require a court to consider whether the alternate forum will be able to exercise personal jurisdiction over all of the parties and, thus, whether a fracturing of the issues related to the case, such a child support, will occur if the court declines to exercise jurisdiction. Second, it would clearly permit a court to consider the public interest when deciding whether to decline to exercise jurisdiction. This would permit judges in the state of Florida to consider whether a parenting plan may resolve visitation and custody issues more efficiently than the procedures available in the alternate jurisdiction. Third, application of the Kinney test would permit a court to consider issues relating to undue delay by the case being brought in the alternate forum. Using the Kinney test would also permit family law courts to access the body of case law applying Rule 1.061 to forum non conveniens issues, and provide additional guidance to the courts and the litigants.
The application of the Kinney test would not prevent a court from considering the factors enumerated in the UCCJEA. The factors enumerated in §61.520(2) may be argued within the framework of Kinney since those all relate either to the private interests of the parties, the public interest of the forum, or both. In addition, since the language of §61.520 indicates that a court is to determine both that it is an inconvenient forum and that the court of another state is a more appropriate forum, applying Kinney also fulfills the apparent intent of the statute. As a final matter, the UCCJEA makes no reference to the power of the parties to determine in a martial settlement agreement or other agreement where future proceedings will be held. Pursuant to the law of forum non conveniens, the parties are empowered to specifically choose that the court entering the initial determination would retain jurisdiction over the matter and, arguably, the conditions under which, the parties would consent that the initial court relinquish jurisdiction to another forum, if any. This provides litigants with additional power to fashion their own agreements and may decrease litigation concerning these issues.
1 Kinney System, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1996).
2 Id. at 93.
3 Generally, “jurisdiction” in this context is considered subject matter jurisdiction. For a discussion as to whether the continuing jurisdiction pursuant to the UCCJEA should be considered subject matter jurisdiction or another form of jurisdiction, see Scott Stephens, Florida’s Third Species of Jurisdiction, 82 Fla. B. J., 10 (March 2008).
4 28 U.S.C. §1738A (2007).
5 28 U.S.C. §1738A(a)(3) (2007).
6 28 U.S.C. §1738A(d) (2007).
7 28 U.S.C. §1738A(c)(1) (2007).
8 Id.
9 28 U.S.C. §1738A(a) (2007).
10 See 28 U.S.C. §1738A (f), (g), (h) (2007).
11 Fla. Stat. §61.514. Section 61.514(a) generally states that, with certain exceptions, a child custody proceeding should be brought in the child’s “home state,” which is defined in Fla. Stat. §61.503(7) as the state in which the child resided continuously for the six months immediately preceding the commencement of the child custody proceeding.
12 Fla. Stat. §61.515 (2008).
13 Fla. Stat. §61.506 (2008). Subsection (1) states that “[a] court of this state shall treat a foreign country as if it were a state of the United States for purposes of applying ss. 61.501 – 61.523.” Section 61.506(2) further states that “a child custody determination made in a foreign country under factual circumstances in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional standards of this part must be recognized and enforced under ss. 61.524 – 61.540.” An exception is made in §61.506(3) for any determination made in a foreign country which violates “fundamental principles of human rights.”
14 Fla. Stat. §61.516(2).
15 Thus, if a Florida court is an “inconvenient forum,” but every other forum would be equally inconvenient (or not more appropriate), then it would seem that the presumption in favor of the plaintiff’s selection of the forum would prevail and Florida would retain jurisdiction.
16 Fla. Stat. §61.520(2).
17 Id. The enumerated factors are as follows: “(a) Whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continue in the future and which state could best protect the parties and the child; (b) The length of time the child has resided outside this state; (c) The distance between the court in this state and the court in the state that would assume jurisdiction; (d) The relative financial circumstances of the parties; (e) Any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume jurisdiction; (f) The nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending litigation, including testimony of the child; (g) The ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the evidence; and (h) The familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues in the pending litigation.”
18 National Conference of Commissions on Uniform State Law, Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, Comment to §207 at 35-6 (1997).
19 Fla. Stat. §47.122 (2008).
20 Fla. Stat. §47.122. That section states, “Change of venue; convenience of parties or witnesses or in the interest of justice. For the convenience of the parties or witnesses or in the interest of justice, any court of record may transfer any civil action to any other court of record in which it might have been brought.”
21 Kinney adopted the federal rule on forum non conveniens and is now codified in Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.061. “The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable in all family law matters except as otherwise provided in these rules.. . . These rules shall govern in cases where a conflict with the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure may occur.” Fla. Fam. R. Pro. 12.020 (2008). While Rule 1.061 is not specifically referenced therein, there is no Family Law Rule of Procedure that appears to conflict with Rule 1.061.
22 Kinney System, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1996).
23 Id. at 87.
24 Kinney, 674 So. 2d at 90 (citing, Pain v. United Technologies, 637 F.2d 775, 784-85 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 1128 (1981).
25 E.g., Murisa Inv. Corp. v. Industrial Cartonera Cominicana, et al., 847 So. 2d 1064, 1066 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 2003).
26 E.g., Telemundo Network Group, LLC, v. Azteca International Corp., 957 So. 2d 705, 710 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 2007).
27 Murisa, 847 So. 2d at 1066-67 (citing the second factor in the Kinney analysis).
28 Id. at 1067.
29 Telemundo, 957 So. 2d at 713.
30 Id. at 713-4; Four Stars Resorts Bahamas, Ltd. v. Allegro Resorts Mgmt. Serv., 734 So.2d 576, 577 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1999). See also Bombardier Capital, Inc. v. Progressive Mktg. Group, Inc., 801 So. 2d 131, 134 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 2001) (“Forum selection clauses are presumptively valid and should be enforced in the absence of a showing that enforcement would be unreasonable or unjust.”).
31 Siegel v. Whitaker, 946 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 2006); Kirsch v. Kirsch, 933 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 2006); Muir v. Muir, 925 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 2006).
32 Staton v. Staton, 787 So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 2001).
33 McDaniel v. Burton, 748 So. 2d 1072, 1074-5 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1999).
34 It is interesting to note that the factors to be considered when determining whether a forum state was an inconvenient forum pursuant to the UCCJA are similar to those outlined in Kinney. See Thomas v. Thomas, 724 So. 2d 1246, 1251 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1999).
35 Hollowell v. Tamburo, 991 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 2008); Spindler v. Mayol, 849 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 2003); Raymond T. McNeal, Jurisdiction in Child Custody Cases, DISS FL-CLE S-4-1 at 12 (The Florida Bar, 2006) (“Custody cases are status proceedings, so personal jurisdiction is not required for the court to enter an enforceable custody determination. Warfield v. Warfield, 661 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1995)”).
36 Shelter Mutual Ins. Co. v. Frederick, 654 So. 2d 656, 658-659 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1995); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
37 McDougald v. Jenson, 596 F. Supp. 680 (N.D. Fla. 1984).
38 Fields v. Fields, 782 So. 2d 530, 534 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 2001) (citing, Cruickshank v. Cruickshank, 420 So. 2d 914, 915 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1982)).
39 Hollowell v. Tamburo, 991 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 2008); Latta v. Latta, 654 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1995), Cook v. Cook, 524, So. 2d 1100, 1100 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1988).
40 Fla. Stat. §61.510 (“Appearance and Limited Immunity — (1) A party to a child custody proceeding, including modification proceeding, [.. . ] is not subject to personal jurisdiction in this state for another proceeding or purpose solely by reason of having participated, or of having been physically present for the purpose of participating, in the proceeding.”).
41 Hollowell v. Tamburo, 991 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 2008).
42 National Conference of Commissions on Uniform State Law, Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, Comment to §207 at 35-6 (1997) (emphasis added).
43 Thomas v. Thomas, 724 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1999).
44 Bacardi v. Lindzon, 728 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1999) (“Unlike. . . Booker v. Booker, 636 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1994), the record contains evidence in support of the motion and demonstrates that the court analyzed the Kinney factors in reaching its decision.” [footnote omitted]).
45 Booker, 636 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1994).
46 McDaniel v. Burton, 748 So. 2d 1072, 1074-5 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1999); Thomas v. Thomas, 724 So. 2d 1246, 1251 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1999); Poliandro v. Springer, 899 So. 2d 441, 444 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 2005); Rohlfs v. Rohlfs, 666 So. 2d 568, 572 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1996).
Lauren M. Ilvento practices at the Draves Law Firm, P.A., in the areas of general business and corporate law, civil litigation, and family law, with a focus on cases with jurisdictional aand business issues and those involving non-U.S. clients. She received a J.D. with honors from The George Washington University National Law Center and an A.B. with honors in International Relations from Brown University.
This column is submitted on behalf of the Family Law Section, Scott Rubin, chair, and Susan W. Savard and Laura Davis Smith, editors.
