The Fellow Officer Rule and the Officer Assistance Statute in Florida: Separate Assessments of Prob
Constitutional principles proscribe the ability of law enforcement officers to make arrests. Warrantless arrests are particularly scrutinized to ensure that the rights of citizens are protected. To effectuate a lawful arrest of any type requires a determination at some point that probable cause exists to make the arrest. Frequently, however, a single officer is unable to provide firsthand evidence of the total circumstances giving rise to probable cause. The officer must instead rely on other officers to put the entire puzzle together. Moreover, an officer often must rely on ordinary citizens to assist in effectuating lawful arrests.
These scenarios are more readily apparent when one considers a few common specific examples. For instance, in Florida a police officer generally is not permitted to arrest a person for a misdemeanor committed outside of the officer’s presence. Frequently, however, an officer may observe some of the elements of the offense, while a partner observes the remaining elements. Or, in other cases, an officer may observe the misdemeanor, but may be in the process of arresting another individual. As a result, the officer may then request another officer to come to the scene to make one of the arrests. If the general rule pertaining to misdemeanors applied, both arrests by the second officer would be unauthorized. However, in both cases in Florida, these arrests would in fact be lawful as explained in this article.
To facilitate the necessary work of police officers, various legal principles have developed, consistent with Fourth Amendment requirements, which assist in the determination of probable cause. In particular in Florida, two principles are frequently relied upon by courts when analyzing whether probable cause exists to make an arrest: the “fellow officer” rule and the “officer assistance” statute. However, attorneys presenting these arguments to the courts often confuse the two and fail to understand the parameters and proper use of each. This confusion likely arises out of the fact that under certain factual scenarios, the two rules will overlap in application. Nevertheless, Florida law recognizes each rule as being distinct, and, under many circumstances, totally unrelated to each other.
The Fellow Officer Rule
The “fellow officer” rule permits an officer to rely upon information supplied by fellow officers when making an arrest.1 T his doctrine is not statutory in origin; rather, it has its basis in the United States Supreme Court decision of Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971). Here, the Supreme Court held that “police officers called upon to aid other officers in executing arrest warrants are entitled to assume that the officers requesting aid offered the magistrate the information requisite to support an independent judicial assessment of probable cause.”2 T he Florida Supreme Court considered the fellow officer rule in Johnson v. State, 660 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1995). The court more broadly recognized the rule as one by which “information shared by officers investigating a crime is imputed to any one of their number, even those from different agencies working together.”3 T he court further recognized that the fellow officer doctrine was “sweeping” in its application, but subject to any limitations imposed by federal Fourth Amendment analysis.4
This rule is also sometimes called the “collective knowledge” doctrine.5 U nder this doctrine, probable cause is determined by the collective knowledge of all officers, even if no individual officer is possessed with sufficient information alone to constitute probable cause.6 I t permits arresting officers to rely on the knowledge of other officers, even if those officers are not within the same agency or jurisdiction.7 I ndeed, the other officers may even be in another state.8 W hen information is received, the arresting officer may assume the information has a reasonable basis in truth.9 T he information may be in the form of an oral directive or a written bulletin.10
Although most Florida cases addressing the fellow officer rule refer to information received from other officers, at least one appellate court has ruled that this information may be supplied by any employee of a law enforcement agency, such as a dispatcher.11 H owever, the case law requires that a traceable link exist from the initial source of the information to the arresting officer.12 B ut, there is no requirement that the information actually be communicated to the arresting officer so long as the information exists within the law enforcement community.13 O nce the information is obtained by any officer, it is imputed to all other officers.14
In determining probable cause to arrest under the fellow officer rule, an officer is entitled to rely on hearsay, even though such hearsay would be inadmissible at trial.15 A n officer is also likely entitled to rely on other evidence which would be inadmissible at trial, including privileged information.16 I f, however, the original officer relied on information later shown to be inaccurate, then probable cause may be vitiated, rendering the arrest unlawful.17
The Officer
Assistance Statute
F.S. §901.18 is another helpful tool which is available to assist law enforcement officers in effectuating lawful arrests. This statute permits an officer who is in the process of making a lawful arrest to summon any other person to the scene to assist in making that arrest. Although one appellate decision has in dictum referred to §901.18 as a “fellow officer” rule,18 t his statute is most clearly not the codification of the fellow officer rule announced in the controlling Whiteley and Johnson precedents. Rather, this statutory provision expands the scope of the fellow officer rule to all those individuals other than simply law enforcement officers in one limited area : when an officer is already in the process of making a lawful arrest.
Unlike the fellow officer rule, the officer assistance statute requires that the officer requesting assistance has already developed probable cause to arrest or has already observed all the elements of the offense.19 E ven an undercover officer can provide this foundational role.20 O nce the process of making a lawful arrest has begun,21 t he officer may request or command the assistance of anyone else to make the arrest, including back-up officers,22 a nd, by the clear language of the statute, even an ordinary citizen.
Because §901.18 applies to any individual person, it is irrelevant whether the assisting officer is located within his or her jurisdiction.23 H owever, unlike the fellow officer rule,24 t he assisting person must actually be summoned by the requesting officer for the purpose of assisting in the arrest.25 I f the assisting person is solely an unsolicited volunteer, the safe harbor of §901.18 does not arise to authorize the arrest.
The assistance statute applies to all offenses, including felonies, misdemeanors,26 a nd even traffic infractions.27 H owever, if the observing officer or initial officer is not legally authorized to make an arrest, due to the lack of probable cause or otherwise, the assistance statute is not triggered at all.28 U nder this circumstance, the state would have to rely on other theories to render the arrest lawful.29
Conclusion
Fourth Amendment protections applicable in Florida state court proceedings require that reviewing courts carefully examine warrantless arrests. The fellow officer rule and officer assistance statute are tools available to assist in this analysis. To avoid the apparent widespread confusion on the reach of these precepts, attorneys from both the prosecution and defense bars need to be well aware of the parameters of these principles to effectively present their arguments to inquiring judges.
q
1 State v. White , 660 So. 2d 664, 667 (Fla. 1995).
2 Whitely, 401 U.S. at 569.
3 Johnson, 660 So. 2d at 654.
4 Id. at 657.
5 Walker v. State , 606 So. 2d 1220, 1221 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1992).
6 Henninger v. State , 667 So. 2d 488, 488 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1996); Bailey v. Board of Comm’rs , 659 So. 2d 295, 300 n.6 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1994); Albo v. State , 477 So. 2d 1071, 1073 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1985).
7 Johnson , 660 So. 2d at 654; Justus v. State , 438 So. 2d 358, 362 (Fla. 1983); Polk v. Williams, 565 So. 2d 1387, 1390 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1990); Morejon v. State , 431 So. 2d 315, 316 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1983); 14 Fla. Jur. 2d Criminal Law §650 (1993); 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure §3.5(b) (3d ed. 1996).
8 Voorhees v. State , 699 So. 2d 602, 610 (Fla. 1997); Carroll v. State , 497 So. 2d 253, 259 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1985), rev. denied , 511 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1987).
9 Voorhees , 699 So. 2d at 609; Smith v. State , 23 Fla. L. Weekly D2444 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1998); State v. Sams , 676 So. 2d 1045, 1046 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1996); State Dep’t of HSMV v. Shonyo , 659 So. 2d 352, 353 n.1 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1995); Carroll , 497 So. 2d at 259.
10 Shonyo , 659 So. 2d at 353 n.1; Carroll , 497 So. 2d at 259. See Nelson v. State , 188 So. 2d 353, 354 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1966).
11 Walker , 606 So. 2d at 1221.
12 Johnson , 660 So. 2d at 657; Crawford v. State , 334 So. 2d 141, 142 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1976); Salas v. State , 246 So. 2d 621, 622 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1971); 14 Fla. Jur. 2d Criminal Law §650.
13 Voorhees , 699 So. 2d at 610; 6A CJS Arrest §32 (1975).
14 Johnson , 660 So. 2d at 654; Smith , 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D2444; State v. Evans , 692 So. 2d 216, 218 & n.3 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1997); Shonyo , 659 So. 2d at 353 n.1; 6A CJS Arrest §32.
15 Routly v. State , 440 So. 2d 1257, 1261 (Fla. 1983); State v. Elkhill , 715 So. 2d 327, 328 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1998). See Crawford , 334 So. 2d at 142; State v. Harrington , 307 So. 2d 466, 468 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1974); Salas , 246 So. 2d at 622; 6A CJS Arrest §32.
16 State v. Ledegang , 6 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 441, 442 (Broward Cty. Ct. 1999).
17 Whiteley , 401 U.S. at 569; White , 660 So. 2d at 667; Walker , 606 So. 2d at 1221; Carroll , 497 So. 2d at 260; Morejon , 431 So. 2d at 316.
18 Leonard , 718 So. 2d at 316. See also State v. Dunn , 5 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 190, 191 (Broward Cty. Ct. 1997).
19 See Leonard , 718 So. 2d at 316; State v. Mahoy , 575 So. 2d 779, 781 & n.4 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1991); State v. Eldridge , 565 So. 2d 787, 788 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1990); Kirby v. State , 217 So. 2d 619, 621 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1969); Dunn , 5 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. at 191; State v. Hoey , 4 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 184, 185 (Palm Beach Cty. Ct. 1996).
20 State v. Cantrell , 426 So. 2d 1035, 1037–38 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1983); State v. Steffani , 398 So. 2d 475, 478–79 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1981).
21 State v. Blakley , 5 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 561, 562 (Broward Cty. Ct. 1998).
22 State v. Ostrow , 579 So. 2d 292, 293 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1991).
23 Clinton v. State , 421 So. 2d 186, 187 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1982); Goodman v. State , 399 So. 2d 1120, 1121 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1981).
24 Carroll , 497 So. 2d at 260 n.9 (under the fellow officer rule, specific request to arrest is not required).
25 Clinton , 421 So. 2d at 187.
26 Leonard , 718 So. 2d at 316; Eldridge , 565 So. 2d at 788; Kirby , 217 So. 2d at 621.
27 McClendon v. State , 440 So. 2d 52, 53–54 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1983).
28 Riehle v. Dep’t of HSMV , 684 So. 2d 823, 824 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1996). Whether the arrest would have been authorized under the fellow officer rule was not addressed by the court. See also State v. Phoenix , 428 So. 2d 262, 265 n.1 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1982).
29 For example, the parameters of a citizen’s arrest for a felony are discussed in Phoenix , 428 So. 2d at 265–66. The parameters of a citizen’s arrest for breach of the peace are discussed in Clinton , 421 So. 2d at 188. The parameters of an extrajurisdictional arrest arising from a police investigation are discussed in Phoenix , 428 So. 2d at 264–65 and Goodman , 399 So. 2d at 1121.
Judge Robert W. Lee has served as a Broward County judge since January 1998. He previously was a shareholder in the law firm of Smith & Hiatt, P.A., Ft. Lauderdale. Judge Lee received his B.A. (President’s honor roll) from Jacksonville University in 1982, and his J.D., with honors, from the University of Florida College of Law in 1985.
This column is submitted on behalf of the Criminal Law Section, George E. Tragos, chair, and Randy E. Merrill, editor.
