When the Verdict Is in but Questions Remain: When and How To Seek Post-Verdict Juror Interviews and Methods for Obtaining Appellate Review
What happens during jury deliberations is the subject of much intrigue. “At one time, it was ‘common practice for counsel to interview jurors at the end of a trial, both to find out “what went wrong” and for the general education of counsel.’”[1] In 1966, however, The Florida Bar asked the Florida Supreme Court to amend the Canons of Ethics Governing Attorneys to require “that a lawyer have ‘reason to believe’ the verdict was subject to challenge” before conducting an interview.[2] The court did so, and then implemented a rule of civil procedure “to establish a procedure for interviewing jurors.”[3] The corollary criminal rule was adopted later in 2004.[4]
Today, the jury deliberation process is recognized as sacrosanct, and the walls of the deliberation room stand as a fortress against outsiders. “There are strong public policies” supporting the secrecy of juror deliberations:[5] jurors’ rights to privacy, for one, and safeguarding the sanctity of the jury process, for another.[6] As the U.S. Supreme Court explained, “full and frank discussion in the jury room, jurors’ willingness to return an unpopular verdict, and the community’s trust in a system that relies on the decisions of laypeople would all be undermined by a barrage of post-verdict scrutiny of juror conduct.”[7]
But sometimes — though rarely[8] — a party’s inviolable right to a fair trial and impartial jury presents an interest that conflicts with the need to keep deliberations secret. In those circumstances, Florida law affords the party a look behind the deliberation room door.
When and how to interview a juror post-verdict — and the permissible subjects of such inquiry — is narrowly prescribed under Florida law. However, Florida courts are not always in accord on the parameters of precedent or the method by which a party may obtain appellate review. This article explores where Florida courts agree and where they part ways.
The Purpose and Permissible Scope of a Post-Verdict Juror Interview
The primary — or, perhaps, only — justifiable reason to conduct a post-verdict juror interview is to investigate potential grounds for challenging the validity of a verdict.
Certain subjects are categorically off-limits. Florida’s Evidence Code prohibits inquiry into matters that “essentially inhere[] in the verdict.”[9] Thus, Florida courts uniformly and “absolutely forbid[],” under any circumstances, “judicial inquiry into emotions, mental processes, or mistaken beliefs of jurors.”[10] For example, an interview is not permitted to discern whether a juror “assent[ed] to the verdict;” whether the juror understood (or “misunderstood”) “the instructions of the [c]ourt;” whether the juror “was unduly influenced by the statements” of other jurors; or whether the juror was “mistaken in his [or her] calculations or judgment.”[11]
When the trial court instructed the jury to award only compensatory damages, but a juror later told counsel that the jury had also “awarded punitive damages,” a post-verdict interview was not allowed.[12] Likewise, whether the jury reached its verdict based on sympathy for the plaintiff — even though Florida’s standard jury instructions preclude jurors from doing so — is a prohibited area of inquiry.[13] So, too, a juror’s expression of remorse about a verdict “is insufficient to warrant an intrusion into the jury’s deliberations.”[14] Even a juror’s racial bias cannot be explored in an interview, unless it was expressed “openly among” the other jurors so as to influence them.[15] As the Florida Supreme Court has explained, each juror’s “innermost thoughts, good and bad, truly inhere in the verdict.”[16]
What, then, may be investigated? Florida courts have identified several categories of conduct that do not inhere in the verdict but are still permissible subjects of inquiry — namely, extrinsic matters or overt acts of juror misconduct.[17]
• Extrinsic Evidence — Juror interviews are permissible to examine whether jurors were exposed to prejudicial, unauthorized evidence, or extrinsic information. For example, in a case involving a vehicle accident, the plaintiff was entitled to a juror interview after learning that the foreman of the jury had driven to the scene of the accident, “performed an ‘experiment’” to determine whether the plaintiff’s claims were viable, and then announced the results of his experiment to the rest of the jury.[18]
To be sure, the scope of permissible inquiry is still limited: the court may examine via interview whether the jury received such extrinsic evidence, but it may not “expand” the inquiry “to ask jurors whether they actually relied upon” the extrinsic information to reach their verdict; the latter type of inquiry would inhere in the verdict by probing the juror’s mental processes and rationale.[19]
• Nondisclosure of Facts During Voir Dire — Florida courts also recognize the propriety of interviewing jurors if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the juror failed to disclose a material fact during voir dire. In such circumstances, courts apply a three-part test, established by the Florida Supreme Court in De La Rosa v. Zequeira, 659 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1995),[20] before allowing the interview. The movant must establish that 1) the undisclosed information was relevant and material to jury service such that, if known, the movant may have peremptorily challenged the juror; 2) the juror concealed (or failed to disclose) the information during questioning; and 3) the failure to disclose the information was not attributable to the party’s lack of diligence during voir dire.[21]
• Overt Acts of Misconduct — Another reason to conduct a juror interview is to investigate overt acts of juror misconduct. Whether the jury reached its verdict improperly, like by “aggregation and average, by lot, by game,” or by “chance,” is one type of overt act about which the court may inquire.[22] The Florida Supreme Court has also recognized that “appeals to racial,” ethnic, religious, or gender bias “made openly among the jurors” constitute overt acts of misconduct.[23] Further, counsel may inquire about the timing of premature deliberations because “[d]eciding a case before hearing all the evidence is antithetical to a fair trial.”[24] Express agreements among the jurors to disregard their oaths or the court’s instructions is another permissible area of inquiry.[25]
Counsel Receives Information That Would Support a Juror Interview — What Now?
In civil cases, the procedure for seeking a juror interview is governed by Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.431(h). Before 2004, there was no corollary criminal rule, so criminal defendants seeking to interview a juror often filed a motion under Rule 1.431.[26] The Florida Supreme Court remedied this void in 2004 with the adoption of Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.575.
Under both rules, a party must set forth sufficient allegations of juror misconduct relating to matters that are extrinsic to the verdict.[27] Otherwise, an interview is prohibited. The respective rules also contain both procedural and substantive requirements that, if not followed by a movant, may preclude the trial court (and later the appellate court) from considering a request to interview jurors. Some of those requirements are straightforward, but others remain murky, despite an abundance of caselaw.
• Time Limitation — Both rules contain a time limitation. In civil cases, the motion must be filed within 15 days after rendition of the verdict, and, in criminal cases, within 10 days.[28] This limitation “suggests that the best time” to request a juror interview “is on the heels of trial,...when memories are fresh and facts more readily ascertained.”[29]
Both rules also provide a narrow exception to the time limitation: A party may request a juror interview outside the applicable timeframe when “good cause” exists for the delay.[30] The movant bears the burden of demonstrating good cause, and to do so, he or she must establish when the information forming the basis of the motion was learned.[31] However, good cause does not exist when the party fails to explain why the information could not have been discovered earlier.[32]
• The Contents — A motion for a juror interview must state the name (and, in civil cases, the address) of each juror to be interviewed.[33] It must also articulate the specific grounds for an inquiry.[34] The motion “does not have to conclusively establish that the alleged incident occurred and actually prejudiced [the movant’s] case.”[35] But it must set forth allegations that are more than merely speculative or conclusory.[36] As the Florida Supreme Court explained in Baptist Hospital of Miami, Inc. v. Maler, 579 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1991), “an inquiry is never permissible unless the moving party has made sworn factual allegations that, if true, would require a trial court to order a new trial.”[37]
Notably, the Maler court’s “reference to ‘sworn allegations’ has caused” some confusion in Florida courts because that requirement is neither referenced in Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.431 (which predated Maler) nor in Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.575 (which was implemented after Maler).[38] In Ramirez v. State, 922 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), the First District concluded that the Florida Supreme Court must have “disavowed” the “sworn allegations” precondition by adopting Rule 3.575 without requiring sworn allegations within the rule.[39]
The Second District, however, found that the requirement for sworn allegations remains in force. Disagreeing with the First District, the court explained that “Ramirez overlooks the fact that when the court decided Maler, [Fla. R. Civ. P.] 1.431 had already been adopted” and contained no requirement for sworn allegations, so Maler “effectively amended” Rule 1.431(h).[40] The Third, Fourth, and Fifth districts have also cited the requirement for sworn allegations, even after the implementation of Rule 3.575.[41]
While the Florida Supreme Court has not expressly addressed the question, it has also continued to quote its language from Maler.[42] The most prudent practice, therefore, is to support a motion to interview jurors (both under the civil and criminal rules) with sworn allegations.
• Rule 4-3.5(d)(4): An Alternative Procedure? — Another source of confusion in the realm of juror interviews stems from Rule Reg. Fla. Bar 4-3.5(d)(4), which generally precludes lawyers from contacting jurors but allows a lawyer to file “a notice of intention to interview” jurors if the lawyer “has reason to believe that grounds” for a legal challenge to the verdict may exist.[43] Notably, Rule 4-3.5(d)(4) does not expressly require a court order after counsel files a notice.
It is not apparent in either the caselaw or the rules of procedure whether Rule 4-3.5 merely supplements the procedural rules or whether it allows counsel to conduct an informal interview by filing a notice and without obtaining court approval.
In Roland v. State, 584 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), before Rule 3.575 was enacted, the First District certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court. Observing that (at the time) no criminal rule requiring a motion existed, the First District queried whether an attorney in a criminal case “must first obtain court approval prior to interviewing the jurors, or whether said attorney may, in accordance with Florida Rule of Processional Conduct 4-3.5(d)(4), simply file a notice of intention to interview.”[44] But Roland was never appealed to the Florida Supreme Court despite the certified question.
In Marshall v. State, 976 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 2007), a defendant appealed the trial court’s order that granted a juror interview but restricted the manner and scope of questioning.[45] The defendant argued that he should have been permitted to informally interview the juror because, under Rule 4-3.5, only a notice was required.[46] The Florida Supreme Court did not reach the issue, however, because it found that the defendant never filed “a notice of intent to interview” under Rule 4-3.5; he had only filed a motion.[47]
In Dowd v. State, 227 So. 3d 194 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017), the Second District recognized that the wording of the procedural rules and Rule 4-3.5 “is not identical,” but it described the distinction, if any, as “largely academic.”[48] The court observed that, regardless of the rule under which a party seeks to interview jurors, counsel must “make the same showing before the court may allow a juror interview,” namely, that the alleged misconduct would invalidate the verdict and require a new trial.[49]
Since the enactment of Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.575, the First District appears to be aligned with the Second District. In Alan v. State, 39 So. 3d 343 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), the court observed that a trial court must enter an order authorizing the interview under either the procedural rule or the Bar rule.[50] In fact, the First District affirmed a criminal contempt order entered against a trial lawyer “for willfully and knowingly contacting” a juror after filing a notice of intent but without obtaining court authorization.[51]
Additionally, the Third and Fourth districts have disapproved of a lawyer contacting jurors informally, without prior court approval, to obtain information in support of a motion to interview jurors. In Seymour v. Solomon, 683 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), counsel “contacted three jurors to determine if they would volunteer to speak with him after trial,” and later filed a motion to interview the jurors based on the information he learned.[52] The Third District held that the trial court should not have considered the motion to interview because “rewarding” counsel’s successful but “violative” contact with the jurors effectively nullified the purpose of limiting juror interviews.[53] In so holding, the Third District observed that the preamble to Rule 4 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar makes clear that it “is not intended to supplement court procedural rules.”[54]
Similarly, in Walgreens, Inc. v. Newcomb, 603 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), the Fourth District held that a lawyer could not call a juror at random and then rely upon information learned during that call to support a motion to interview the jurors.[55] The court explained, “A party ought not be able to obtain relief by violating the [r]ules when the relief could not be obtained by compliance with the rules.”[56]
Importantly, while counsel may not contact jurors, the rules do not preclude the reverse: they are “not intended to be used as a sword to prevent jurors from” initiating contact with either the parties or the court “to reveal misconduct.”[57] Therefore, if a juror initiates the interaction — either by contacting the trial judge,[58] an attorney,[59] a court reporter,[60] or anyone else[61] — the information provided by that juror can be used as a basis for a motion to interview.
But unless a juror initiates the contact, the safer practice is to seek and obtain a court order before any interview. This approach both ensures compliance with ethical and professional rules and preserves the issue for appellate review.
Appellate Review and Considerations
Orders denying a motion for juror interviews are often reviewed via final appeal of a judgment (sometimes alongside other claimed errors that occurred at trial). The decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.[62]
Orders granting juror interviews may also be reviewed on final appeal and, as with denial orders, are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.[63] But by the time an appellate court reviews an order granting an interview via final appeal, it may be too late because the interview may have already occurred. For this reason, most (but not all) district courts recognize that an order granting a juror interview is reviewable via certiorari.[64]
The jurisdictional inquiry for certiorari review is whether the order will cause “a material injury that cannot be corrected on appeal, otherwise termed as irreparable harm.”[65] Most recently, the Fifth District explained why certiorari lies for an order granting juror interviews: because jurors are “members of the court,”[66] an erroneous post-verdict juror interview “implicates not just the privacy rights of an individual juror, but the very construct and process of the court itself.”[67]
Almost all other district courts of appeal have also addressed the merits of certiorari petitions dealing with juror interviews, though not all have expressly analyzed the irreparable-harm requirement.[68] (The Sixth District is the only court that does not appear to have addressed the question. The Fourth District, without citing any rule, has “treat[ed]” a petition for writ of certiorari “as an appeal from [an] order” granting juror interviews.[69] But five years later, the Fourth District reviewed such an order under its certiorari jurisdiction.)[70]
The First District stands alone, however, finding in Laycock v. TMS Logistics, Inc., 209 So. 3d 627 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017), that an order granting juror interviews cannot establish the jurisdictional, irreparable-harm requirement for certiorari review.[71] The court found that irreparable harm must be to the petitioner, himself or herself, rather than an “ethereal injury to the civil trial process.”[72] The court explained, “it is settled law that, as a condition precedent to invoking a district court’s certiorari jurisdiction, the petitioning party must establish that it has suffered an irreparable harm that cannot be remedied on appeal.”[73] In dismissing the certiorari petition for lack of jurisdiction, the First District recognized that (at the time) all five of Florida’s district courts, including the First District itself, had reached the merits of certiorari petitions dealing with juror interviews. The court further observed that, in Maler, the Florida Supreme Court approved a district court decision that had granted certiorari. But, in doing so, the Florida Supreme Court did not “breath[e] a word” about the irreparable-harm requirement, so the First District concluded that it could not interpret Maler as modifying the irreparable-harm-to-the-petitioner requirement for certiorari jurisdiction.[74]
Whether the First District got it right in Laycock or whether other district courts of appeal correctly reached the merits of certiorari petitions remains to be seen. While the Laycock court certified conflict, the Florida Supreme Court has not reached the question. Until then, the method of appellate review for orders granting juror interviews presents another topic of disagreement among Florida’s courts.
Concluding Remarks
A juror interview is not a vehicle to conduct “a fishing expedition.” Rather, to safeguard the “sanctity of the verdict-forming process,”[75] juror interviews are justifiably rare, and the subjects about which the court may allow inquiry are appropriately narrow. Sometimes, circumstances do warrant a peek inside the jury deliberation room — not to ask a juror about his or her thought process, but to inquire about overt prejudicial acts that may have deprived a party of the right to a fair trial. In those circumstances (or when an opponent alleges they exist), counsel should be equipped with the keys to unlock (or lock) the deliberation room door — keeping in mind that the required keys may vary by jurisdiction.
[1] Dowd v. State, 227 So. 3d 194, 196-97 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (first quoting Brassell v. Brethauer, 305 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); then citing Branch v. State, 212 So. 2d 29, 32 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968); and then citing Bullard v. State, 324 So. 2d 652, 655 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975) (Boyer, C.J., dissenting)).
[2] Id. at 197 (brackets omitted).
[3] Id. (citing In re The Fla. Bar, Rules of Civ. Proc., 339 So. 2d 626, 629 (Fla. 1976)).
[4] Id. at 198 (citing Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.575); see Amends. to the Fla. Rules of Crim. Proc., 886 So. 2d 197, 198-99 (Fla. 2004).
[5] State, Dep’t of Transp. v. Rejrat, 540 So. 2d 911, 913 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).
[6] Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. v. Maler, 579 So. 2d 97, 99 (Fla. 1991) (noting that the prohibition of “judicial inquiry into emotions, mental processes, or mistaken beliefs of jurors…rests on a fundamental policy that litigation will be extended needlessly if the motives of jurors are subject to challenge,” and “also rests on a policy of preventing litigants or the public from invading the privacy of the juror room”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Fla. Stat. §90.607(2)(b)).
[7] Devoney v. State, 717 So. 2d 501, 504 (Fla. 1998) (quoting Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120-21 (1989)).
[8] Rejrat, 540 So. 2d at 912 (quoting Schmitz v. S.A.B.T.C. Townhouse Ass’n, 537 So. 2d 130, 131 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)).
[9] Fla. Stat. §90.607(2)(b).
[10] Maler, 579 So. 2d at 99.
[11] Id.; see also State v. Hamilton, 574 So. 2d 124, 128 (Fla. 1991).
[12] Comer v. Hudson, 781 So. 2d 514, 515-16 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).
[13] Maler, 579 So. 2d at 100.
[14] Ibar v. State, 360 So. 3d 397, 399 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023).
[15] Powell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 652 So. 2d 354, 357 (Fla. 1995).
[16] Id.
[17] Rejrat, 540 So. 2d at 913 (the distinction “may be difficult in some cases”).
[18] Bickel v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 557 So. 2d 674, 675 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); see also Snook v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 485 So. 2d 496, 499 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (interview warranted when juror allegedly “consult[ed]” with another person regarding the accuracy of testimony and then “reported” his discussion to other jurors); Melrose Nursery, Inc. v. Collinsworth, Alter, Nielson, Fowler & Dowling, Inc., 832 So. 2d 891, 893 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (“Without inquiry of the jury, it is unclear what information the juror obtained and became privy to and, perhaps, more importantly, what of that information, if any, did he bring to deliberations.”).
[19] Maler, 579 So. 2d at 101 (emphasis added).
[20] De La Rosa, 659 So. 2d at 241.
[21] Westgate Palace, LLC v. Parr, 216 So. 3d 747, 750 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017); Rodgers v. After Sch. Programs, Inc., 78 So. 3d 42, 45 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); Morgan v. Milton, 105 So. 3d 545, 548 (Fla 1st DCA 2012).
[22] Maler, 579 So. 2d at 100.
[23] Powell, 652 So. 2d at 357; Devoney, 717 So. 2d at 504 (recognizing that Powell’s rationale applies to “sentiments of racial, ethnic, religious or gender bias”); see also Wright v. CTL Distrib., Inc., 679 So. 2d 1233, 1235 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (“While our judiciary can do little about those individuals who silently bring biases and prejudices into the sanctity of the deliberative process, the judiciary can, should, and indeed must take action to ensure that such individuals do not feel free to openly express such biases and prejudices, and to thereby infect the fairness of the very process which it is their sworn duty to uphold.”).
[24] Ramirez v. State, 922 So. 2d 386, 389-90 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); see also Phelps v. State, 186 So. 3d 598, 600 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016).
[25] Maler, 579 So. 2d at 100.
[26] See Marshall v. State, 976 So. 2d 1071, 1080 n.5 (Fla. 2007); see also Roland v. State, 584 So. 2d 68, 70 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (stating that, “as a matter of practice, motions for juror interviews [were] filed in criminal cases” even before the rule requiring such a motion).
[27] Orange County v. Fuller, 502 So. 2d 1364, 1364 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987); see also Darling v. State, 81 So. 3d 574, 577-78 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (citing Boyd v. State, 910 So. 2d 167, 178 (Fla. 2005)).
[28] Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.431(h); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.575.
[29] Bates v. State, 398 So. 3d 406, 407 (Fla. 2024).
[30] Id. at 408 n.3 (treating the good cause exception under both rules as “nearly identical”).
[31] Id. at 407-08.
[32] Maiya v. Kennedy, 743 So. 2d 1183, 1184 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
[33] Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.431(h); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.575.
[34] Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.431(h) (providing that the motion must state “the grounds for challenge that the party believes may exist”); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.575 (the motion must state “the reasons that the party has to believe that the verdict may be subject to challenge”).
[35] Snook, 485 So. 2d at 498-99.
[36] State v. Montserrate-Jacobs, 89 So. 3d 294, 296 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012); Simon v. Maldonado, 65 So. 3d 8, 11-12 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that the “possibility” of jury misconduct, such as the failure to disclose prior litigation, was in and of itself an insufficient ground for jury interview).
[37] Maler, 579 So. 2d at 100.
[38] Dowd, 227 So. 3d at 198 n.7.
[39] Ramirez, 922 So. 2d at 388-89; but see Davidson v. State, 396 So. 3d 636, 638-39 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024) (quoting Whittin v. State, 161 So. 3d 314, 332 (Fla. 2014) for the proposition that sworn allegations are required, without addressing Ramirez).
[40] Dowd, 227 So. 3d at 198 n.7 (quoting City of Winter Haven v. Allen, 589 So. 2d 968, 969 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)).
[41] Ibar, 360 So. 3d at 398; Westgate Palace, 216 So. 3d at 749; Penalver v. Masomere, 178 So. 3d 533, 535 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015); Egitto v. Wittman, 980 So. 2d 1238, 1240 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008); but see Pozo v. State, 963 So. 2d 831, 835 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (Rule 3.575 “does not require the filing of sworn affidavits,” and “in this respect the rule digresses from prior [caselaw]” (citing Reaves v. State, 826 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 2002)); Gray v. State, 72 So. 3d 336, 337 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (same)).
[42] Joseph v. State, 336 So. 3d 218, 235 (Fla. 2022) (“[I]n order to be entitled to interview jurors, [the defendant] must present sworn allegations....” (quotations omitted)); Crain v. State, 78 So. 3d 1025, 1045 (Fla. 2011) (same).
[43] Rul. Reg. Fla. Bar 4-3.5(d)(4).
[44] Roland, 584 So. 2d at 70.
[45] Marshall, 976 So. 2d at 1079-80.
[46] Id.
[47] Id. at 1079.
[48] Dowd, 227 So. 3d at 198-99.
[49] Id. at 198.
[50] Alan, 39 So. 3d at 345 (“[A]ttorneys who suspect juror misconduct are permitted to interview individual jurors, but may do so only after they file a notice of intent to interview and the presiding court enters an order authorizing the interview.” (emphasis added)).
[51] Id. at 345.
[52] Seymour, 683 So. 2d at 168.
[53] Id.
[54] Id. at 168 n.1.
[55] Walgreens, 603 So. 2d at 5-6.
[56] Id. at 6.
[57] Naugle v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 133 So. 3d 1235, 1238 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (emphasis added).
[58] Id. at 1239.
[59] See Maler, 579 So. 2d at 98; Devoney, 717 So. 2d at 502.
[60] See Melrose, 832 So. 2d at 893.
[61] See Phelps, 186 So. 3d at 599 (juror approached defendant’s mother); Dowd, 227 So. 3d at 196 (alternate juror approached defendant’s family); Ibar, 360 So. 3d at 398 (juror contacted judge’s chambers and posted comments on online forum); Davidson, 396 So. 3d at 637 (juror approached defense’s expert).
[62] Marshall, 976 So. 2d at 1076 (“Florida appellate courts have uniformly held that a court’s decision on whether to allow an interview of jurors after trial is subject to review for an abuse of discretion.”).
[63] Laycock v. TMS Logistics, Inc., 209 So. 3d 627, 631 n.3 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (“Direct appeals frequently address orders that granted juror interviews.”).
[64] Children’s Med. Ctr., P.A. v. Kim, 221 So. 3d 664, 668 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (“Certiorari has been used to review orders allowing post-trial juror interviews.”); State v. Monserrate-Jacobs, 89 So. 3d 294, 296 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (“Florida courts have traditionally utilized the writ of certiorari to review” orders granting juror interviews “so as to ensure that such an order will not result in a breach of the sanctity of jury deliberations.”).
[65] Laycock, 209 So. 3d at 628-29 (quoting Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. San Perdido Ass’n, 104 So. 3d 344, 351 (Fla. 2012)).
[66] Huether v. Baroni, 394 So. 3d 1245, 1250 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024) (bracket omitted).
[67] Id.
[68] See Laycock, 209 So. 3d at 629 (identifying cases); see also Pesci v. Maistrellis, 672 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (exercising certiorari jurisdiction based upon harm to the “sanctity of jury deliberations”); Orange County v. Piper, 585 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (granting certiorari “to prohibit invasion of the sanctity of jury deliberations”).
[69] Travent, Ltd. v. Schecter, 678 So. 2d 1345, 1347 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); see also Egitto, 980 So. 2d at 1239.
[70] Naugle, 133 So. 3d at 1236.
[71] Laycock, 209 So. 3d at 629.
[72] Id. at 630 (internal quotation marks omitted).
[73] Id. (quoting Jaye v. Royal Saxon, Inc., 720 So. 2d 214, 215 (Fla. 1998)).
[74] Id. at 630-31.
[75] Travelers Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 610 So. 2d 680, 681 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).
Sydney Feldman D’Angelo is a shareholder at GrayRobinson, where she devotes her practice to civil appeals and trial support. She has represented clients in all of Florida’s district courts of appeal, the Florida Supreme Court, the U.S. courts of appeals for the Fourth and 11th circuits, and jurisdictions outside of Florida.
Lucia Leoni is an appellate and trial support attorney representing clients in civil matters in state and federal courts. Before joining GrayRobinson, she clerked for Judge Bronwyn C. Miller at Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal.
This column is submitted on behalf of the Appellate Practice Section, Joe Eagleton, chair, and Benjamin Paley, Matthew Cavender, Amber S. Nunnally, Huiping (Lily) Liu, Nick McNamara, and Dayna Maeder, editors.
